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Do Firms Really Allocate Capital So Inefficiently?

Abstract
The capital allocation process is a critical component of strategic execution for multidivisional
firms. Despite this importance, strategy scholars have ceded much of the empirical work in
capital allocation efficiency to the domains of finance and economics. The bulk of this research,
as well as evidence from prominent field studies in strategic management, concludes that
managers make significantly inefficient capital allocation decisions—a result that should be of
concern to business managers and strategy scholars alike. This paper asks whether managers are
truly allocating capital so inefficiently, or do they instead have a valid strategic rationale that
explains their investment decisions. Building off the general framework of internal capital
market efficiency from financial economics, this paper develops a new measure of strategic
capital allocation. The new approach introduces a multidimensional measure to capture the
strategic trade-offs between future growth and current profitability, which are faced by managers
during the complex resource allocation process. In the first stage of the empirical analysis,
managers are found to be allocating capital more than twice as efficiently than prior literature
suggests. The second stage validates this multidimensional approach by demonstrating the
predicted theoretical relationship between a strategic measure of capital allocation and firm-level
value, namely, that managers appear to be capable of enhancing performance through strategic
capital allocation.

1

1

INTRODUCTION
The capital allocation process is a critical component of strategic execution. Through the

efficient allocation of internal capital resources, top-level managers of the multidivisional firm
should be able to enhance firm-level performance (Chandler 1962; Williamson 1975; Stein
1997). Long-term competitive advantage requires them to develop unique combinations of
resources through a strategic capital allocation process (Rumelt 1984; Wernerfelt 1984; Dierickx
and Cool 1989). However, the central conclusions from prominent field research (Christensen
and Bower 1996; Sull 1999), as well as the bulk of empirical results (Lamont 1997; Shin and
Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and
Seru 2007; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), suggest that the internal allocation of capital is
significantly inefficient. While some instances of empirical work do find that multidivisional
firms allocate capital efficiently (Khanna and Tice 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips 1998), the
prevailing conclusion (Stein 2003) is that agency costs distort the resource allocation process
within internal capital markets (Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan et al. 2000). In the strategic
management literature, recent research by Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo (2011) also concludes that
firms are inefficiently allocating capital among their business units, primarily due to naïve
behavioral biases (Bromiley 1986; Barney and Zajac 1994; Gilbert 2001; Garbuio, King, and
Lovallo 2011).
Given the critical link between resource allocation and strategy, the high and persistent
levels of inefficient capital allocation documented in the literature should be of concern to
business managers and strategy scholars alike. A concrete example from Billett and Mauer
(2003) highlights the concern: the authors find that multidivisional firms efficiently allocate
capital among only 25% of their operating segments; i.e., firms appear to be destroying value

2

through inefficient capital allocation decisions as much as 75% of the time. This paper asks
whether managers are truly allocating capital so inefficiently, or do they instead have a valid
strategic rationale that explains their investment decisions. As suggested by the bulk of evidence
cited above, strategy scholars have ceded much of the empirical work in capital allocation
efficiency to the domains of finance and economics.1 The interdisciplinary approach in this paper
thus extends the general framework of internal capital market efficiency from financial
economics (Berger and Ofek 1995; Rajan et al. 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003) to provide new
insights into what I define as strategic capital allocation.
In the first stage of the empirical analysis I evaluate the efficiency of internal capital
markets from a strategic perspective and compare it to the traditional approach from the extant
literature. In contrast to prior work that relies on uni-dimensional measures (see Sections 2 and 3
for more detail), I develop a multidimensional measure of capital allocation efficiency to capture
the strategic trade-offs between current profitability and future growth (Marris 1963; Marris
1964; Williamson 1964), which are faced by managers during the complex process of resource
allocation (Bower 1970; Burgelman 1983). As previously noted, research by Billett and Mauer
(2003) finds that firms are allocating capital efficiently among only 25% of their segments, and I
replicate those results within a longer sample period from 1979 to 2009. Then, using the
multidimensional measure of strategic capital allocation proposed in this paper, I find that firms
are efficiently allocating capital 53% of the time, more than twice as often than prior literature
suggests.
The validity of any new measure depends on its ability to systematically predict the
expected relationships of the underlying theory (Venkatraman and Grant 1986), therefore the
1

An exception in the strategy literature is the work by Bardolet et al. (2011). In the introduction to their empirical
analysis, the authors remark, “Given the important role capital allocation plays in business strategy, it is surprising
that this topic has received relatively little attention in the empirical strategy literature” (Bardolet et al. 2011, 1455).
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second stage of the analysis attempts to validate the new, multidimensional measure of strategic
capital allocation.2 If the measure truly captures the strategic trade-offs faced by managers during
the complex resource allocation process, these capital allocation decisions should enhance firm
value. To validate this expected theoretical relationship, I calculate the value-added from internal
capital market allocations (Rajan et al. 2000; Peyer 2002; Billett and Mauer 2003) and test its
association with proxies of firm-level performance. Consistent with extant literature, value-added
based on the uni-dimensional measure of internal capital market efficiency shows an
insignificant (and sometimes negative) association with performance.3 On the other hand, valueadded from the strategic measure of capital allocation shows a positive and significant
association in all tests, and the results are robust for up to five years following the resource
allocation decision. These results validate the new, multidimensional measure of capital
allocation efficiency—firms appear to be capable of enhancing performance through strategic
capital allocation.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, the paper investigates a fundamental
component of strategic management theory and practice—the efficiency of a firm’s internal
capital allocation processes—that has been largely neglected by strategy scholars of late. The
internal capital market of the firm is a fundamental component strategic performance. The
2

In this context, Peter (1979) defines validity as “the degree to which instruments truly measure the constructs they
are intended to measure.” Construct validity tests, for example, have traditionally been carried out in the strategy
literature for firm-level diversification measures (Lubatkin, Merchant, and Srinivasan 1993) and more recently for
business unit-level relatedness measures (Bryce and Winter 2009).
3
The insignificant and negative associations are consistent with prior work showing a diversification discount for
multidivisional firms (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Servaes 1996). While this literature has been
criticized for selection and measurement biases (Whited 2001; Campa and Kedia 2002; Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf
2002; Villalonga 2004; Chevalier 2004), research designs that examine the diversification discount both before and
after the divestment decisions of multidivisional firms attempt to mitigate these biases (Gertner, Powers, and
Scharfstein 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani 2003; Burch and Nanda 2003; Ahn and Denis 2004). My research avoids
this debate because it is not focused on the diversification discount, but on the internal allocation of capital within
diversified firms. I am only comparing the efficiency of individual segments within each firm, not the efficiency (or
market value, as in the diversification discount) between multidivisional and focused firms. The two strands of
research are naturally related in that an inefficient internal capital market is often cited as an explanation for the
diversification discount.

4

second contribution is of paramount importance for the practice of strategy: the results in this
paper provide insight for managers on how to create value through strategic capital allocation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
internal capital allocation efficiency in the strategic management and financial economics
literatures, while Section 3 builds on this review to develop a new measure of strategic capital
allocation. In Section 4 I describe the empirical methods, sample definition, and the construction
of key variables for the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6
concludes. I also include a discussion of limitations and the significant contributions of this
paper in the final section.

2

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A fundamental development of the M-form organization during the 1920s, as first

chronicled by Chandler (1962) at DuPont, General Motors, and Standard Oil, is the introduction
of a top-level executive committee responsible for the firm’s long-term capital allocation
decisions. These capital allocation decisions are conducted within an “internal capital market,”
where business-unit managers compete for the scarce resources of the firm (Williamson 1970).
For the multidivisional firm, an internal capital market provides a significant amount of the
resources available for the execution of its strategic objectives. A recent empirical investigation
by McKinsey & Company, for example, estimates that “the amount of capital allocated or
reallocated” within internal capital markets is more than the amount of external funding from
equity and debt combined (Hall, Lovallo, and Musters 2012).
Research in strategic management has long recognized that the capital allocation process
is a critical component of strategic execution. Chandler (1962, 16) goes so far as to define
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strategy in terms of the resource allocation process: “Strategy can be defined as the
determination of the basic long-term goals” of the firm, as well as “the allocation of resources
necessary for carrying out these goals.” Similarly, Williamson (1975) analyzes the important
functions of internal capital markets and argues that “the assignment of cash flows to high-yield
uses is the most fundamental attribute” of multidivisional firms. In his seminal field research on
the resource allocation process, Bower (1970) concludes in part that resource allocation drives
strategy.4 The link between strategy and capital allocation is particularly important from a
resource-based view of the firm. Lippman and Rumelt (2003) describe strategy as “the problem
of discovering or estimating the value of various resource combinations.” Earlier, Rumelt (1984)
postulates an entrepreneurial theory of strategy where firms make resource allocation decisions
in an attempt to create competitive advantage. He concludes that the decision of where to
compete by investing scarce resources is one of “the most critical strategic choices” faced by
firms.
Despite the importance of the resource allocation process to strategic management (both
in theory and in practice), much of the research on capital allocation efficiency has been carried
out by scholars in finance and economics. The remainder of this section describes this work in
more detail. First, I outline the theoretical perspectives of efficiency within an internal capital
market; then I introduce prominent field studies and empirical results from strategy and financial
economics, both of which overwhelmingly conclude that the capital allocation process is
inefficient.

4

In their review of the strategic resource allocation literature, Bower, Doz, and Gilbert (2005, 12) summarize this
point succinctly: “How resources are actually allocated and used determines strategic outcomes—not the words on
paper or policies.” In the same volume, Gilbert and Christensen (2005, 84) describe the resource allocation process
as being “inseparably connected to strategy.”
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Theoretical Background of Capital Market Efficiency
Williamson (1970; 1975) first introduces the theoretical argument that the internal capital
allocation process can be value-enhancing for the multidivisional firm. In a world of limited
contracting and bounded rationality, the ability of top management to allocate resources among
divisions may limit the opportunism of divisional managers. Rather than automatically
reinvesting free cash flow at the division level, profitable business units must return excess cash
to the top-level managers of the firm. This “miniature” capital market within the firm can
enhance allocation efficiency by subjecting all free cash flow to an “internal competition” among
the business units (Williamson 1970; 1975). Work by Gertner at al. (1994) argues that top-level
management in the multidivisional firm maintains a unique “control right,” giving it unilateral
decision-making over the reallocation of capital toward better-performing divisions.5 Stein
(1997) further develops a theoretical model where management utilizes this control right to
engage in “winner picking,” efficiently reallocating capital from the firm’s “losing” projects to
the “winners.”
A different theoretical perspective, however, has dominated much of the extant literature.
Agency costs, both at the level of top management and internally among divisions, can distort
the capital allocation process and lead to inefficient investments.6 Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
develop a model where managers of relatively worse performing divisions exhibit “rent-seeking”
behavior (Milgrom and Roberts 1990) in order to accumulate more compensation than their
skills are objectively worth. Instead of compensating these managers with cash, top management
distorts the internal capital market by rewarding them with additional capital subsidies from the

5

The idea of a “control right” is first introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986).
A working paper by Alok and Gopalan (2012) uses a unique dataset to examine how the compensation structures
of business unit managers in multidivisional firms may act to mitigate these agency conflicts. Wulf (2002) finds that
the compensation incentives and investment decisions of division-level managers are substitutes.
6
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firm’s relatively better performing businesses. Similarly, Rajan et al. (2000) describe how power
struggles between divisions with heterogeneous investment opportunities can lead to an
inefficient capital market within the firm. In their theoretical model, managers are more
interested in developing the profitability of their divisions than the overall profitability of the
firm, which drives top management to cross-subsidize the weaker performing divisions.
Bromiley (1986) and Barney and Zajac (1994) highlight the importance of behavioral
phenomena on the resource allocation decisions of top management. The field work by Gilbert
(2001) within the newspaper industry provides a compelling example. He shows that prospect
theory and risk framing (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) can influence the cognitive architecture
underlying the capital allocation process. Recent research by Garbuio et al. (2011) also applies
constructs from psychology and behavioral science to explore how the capital allocation process
is influenced by managerial heuristics and biases. The authors consider the possibility of adverse
effects related to resource endowments, familiarity, extremeness aversion, anchoring, and
partition dependence. Although Garbuio et al. (2011) allow that capital allocation based on
heuristics might also be efficient, their propositions provide a summary outline of how
managerial biases can result in suboptimal allocation decisions for the firm.

Field Research and Empirical Evidence of Inefficient Capital Markets
While the bulk of empirical evidence on capital allocation efficiency is rooted in the
financial economics literature, I also highlight two prominent field studies that illustrate the
resource allocation process from the perspective of strategic management.7 Christensen and
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In addition to the works of Christensen and Bower (1996) and Sull (1999), which are detailed here, other scholars
that have examined inefficiencies within in the resource allocation process include Eisenman and Bower (2000) in
the cable industry, Noda and Bower (1996) in the regional telecom industry, and Kuemmerle (1999) in international
expansion decisions.
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Bower (1996) show that industry leaders failed to invest in new, strategically important products
(i.e., the 5.25-inch hard-disk-drives for desktop personal computers in the early 1980s) that did
not match the firms’ current strategic context (which was focused on 8-inch drives for
minicomputers). These once-leading firms tended to fail. In another example, Sull (1999) finds
that top management at Firestone Tire & Rubber failed to make strong investments into new
technologies (i.e., radial tires first developed by Michelin) during the 1960s and 1970s, in part
due to Firestone’s outdated strategic context (which was focused on bias tire technology).
Firestone went on to lose a significant amount of market value before eventually being acquired.8
In both field studies, top management recognized the threat from new and growing markets early
in the investment process, but they continued to allocate capital to their still profitable
businesses.9
Empirically, two examples of efficient internal capital markets come from Khanna and
Tice (2001) in the retail industry and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) in the manufacturing
industry. Khanna and Tice (2001) examine the exogenous shock of WalMart’s entry into new
markets. They find that multidivisional firms with related divisions allocate less cash flow to
their divisions with declining productivity, i.e., those competing against WalMart in its new
markets. The results suggest that these retail firms operate an efficient internal capital market
when facing external, competitive pressure. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) use U.S. Census
data to show that manufacturing firms appear to allocate capital efficiently at the plant level.

8

The field research on Firestone (Sull 1999) is also an example of inefficient divestment, an area where strategy
researchers have made interesting contributions to the analysis of resource allocation decisions (Duhaime and Grant
1984; Duhaime and Schwenk 1985; Shimizu and Hitt 2005; Shimizu 2007). For example, Elfenbein and Knott
(2011) show that 85% of business exits occur later than what would be rationally predicted in an option-value
model.
9
In fact, the leading firms in the hard-disk-drive industry were the first to develop many of the new technologies,
but they then failed to adjust their strategic context away from currently profitable product lines (Christensen and
Bower 1996).

9

Investment in a productive plant increases after a positive demand shock in its own industry, as
well as after a negative demand shock in other the industries where the firm operates.
These two, industry-specific studies notwithstanding, the preponderance of empirical
evidence suggests that firms are not allocating their internal capital resources efficiently. Using
the international oil crisis in 1986 as an exogenous shock, Lamont (1997) presents evidence that
multidivisional oil firms were inefficiently subsidizing their divisions in unrelated, non-oil
industries. Post-shock, the oil firms decreased these non-oil investments, even though the
investment outlook of those industries was not affected by the shock and other firms in those
industries did not decrease their investment levels. Shin and Stulz (1998) use a large-sample
empirical test to find similar results. They show that a segment’s association with the cash flow
of other segments does not depend on whether the segment has the best investment opportunities
within the firm. In an efficient internal capital market, we would expect that segments with better
investment opportunities have priority in the allocation of capital, not that segments appear to be
treated equally, as the evidence in Shin and Stulz (1998) suggests.
After they develop their theoretical model of rent-seeking divisions within the firm,
Rajan et al. (2000) empirically demonstrate this inefficiency. They show that segments with
relatively high investment opportunities make cash flow transfers and, conversely, that segments
with relatively low investment opportunities receive cash flow subsidies. Billett and Mauer
(2003) examine these cash flow transfers and subsidies directly, using cash flow and investment
data at the segment level. They find that only 25% of segment-level investments are efficient.
Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007), in their study of Indian conglomerates, also examine cash
flows directly at the level of the business group and demonstrate that excess cash tends to flow
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toward underperforming groups.10 Even after receiving this internal funding, the subsidized
business groups continue to exhibit lower performance, suggesting the excess cash was not used
on profitable investment opportunities.
Using carefully matched segments, Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) show that
multidivisional firms tend to invest less than their standalone peers in industries with relatively
high investment opportunities and more than those peers in industries with relatively low
investment opportunities.11 By looking at allocation decisions when managers have lower
ownership stakes in the firm, the authors also argue that the inefficient capital allocation is likely
due to agency costs. Stein (2003) summarizes the state of the empirical literature in his chapter
on corporate investment in the Handbook of the Economics of Finance. He comes to the
conclusion that “the weight of the current evidence” is that inefficient cross-subsidization exists
within internal capital markets.
From a strategic management perspective, Bardolet et al. (2011) examine capital
allocation decisions within the context of managerial biases (Zajac and Barney 1994; Gilbert
2001; Garbuio et al. 2011). The authors use a unique combination of empirical and experimental
tests to show that firms are cross-subsidizing segments in a socialistic manner. They find that
firms tend to allocate capital evenly among all of their business units, regardless of investment
opportunity set, size, and industry. While their empirical results are consistent with those from

10

Even more interesting, Gopalan et al. (2007) explain an underlying mechanism of these seemingly inefficient cash
flow transfers. In contrast to a business segment in the U.S., Indian business groups can access the external capital
markets directly. When an Indian business group is underperforming, its partners may subsidize the struggling
business to help it avoid bankruptcy, because bankruptcy would have adverse effects on the surviving business
groups as well.
11
Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) is an “extensive reworking” of Scharfstein (1998), originally published via the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). They employ a non-parametric matching procedure to control for
size, age, and profitability, a significant improvement over matched samples for multidivisional segments and
focused firms in prior literature.
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the extant literature, the authors use experimental tests to conclude that a naïve tendency to
diversify is driving these inefficient allocation decisions, as opposed to agency conflicts.

3

TOWARD A NEW MEASURE OF STRATEGIC CAPITAL ALLOCATION
This paper proposes that the empirical results in the extant literature may be driven

largely by a measurement problem. From the traditional perspective, an internal capital market is
deemed inefficient when the firm provides free cash flow to business units that have relatively
worse investment opportunities than other units. The inefficient firm cross subsidizes these
weaker divisions at the expense of divisions with relatively better investment opportunities.
Researchers have traditionally employed uni-dimensional proxies to measure these investment
opportunities for efficiency. These proxies include Tobin’s Q (Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan et al.
2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), sales growth (Lamont 1997), and
return on assets (Billett and Mauer 2003).
I contend that these uni-dimensional measures are problematic because they ignore the
possibility that firms make value-maximizing strategic trade-offs in the resource allocation
process.12 One critical trade-off is the need for multidivisional firms to make investment
decisions based on both current profitability and for future growth (Marris 1963; Marris 1964).
Building on Penrose’s (1959) theory on the growth of firms, Marris (1963) shows that top
management desires both profitability (i.e., size) and growth (i.e., positive changes in size). In
the theoretical model, maximizing one strategic objective does not always maximize the other;
12

Rajan et al. (2001) also point out that a proxy for a division’s investment opportunities may need to be more
nuanced than a uni-dimensional measure can capture. To account for the varying investment opportunities of large
and small firms, they build a two-dimensional classification based on segment-level Tobin’s Q and an assetweighted Tobin’s Q. Other, more-nuanced proxies include sales per square foot (Khanna and Tice 2001) and total
factor productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002), both of which show efficient allocations of capital in their
respective industry samples. Wulf (2002) also uses a two-dimensional approach based on ROA and the subjective
recommendations of managers to analyze the resource allocation decision.
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managers are forced to make strategic trade-offs between the two objectives. Similar economic
models that highlight the trade-off between current profits and future growth are also developed
by Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1964).
Uni-dimensional measures of capital allocation efficiency may also lack the nuance to
capture the complex, multilayered process of resource allocation (Bower 1970; Burgelman
1983). Bower (1970) documents the complexity of aligning the strategic objectives of a
multidivisional firm to its capital allocation decisions.13 He builds a multilayered model where
top-level management (corporate), general managers in the middle, and operating managers at
the business-unit level all interact within the resource allocation process. Because this process is
spread across multiple levels of the firm, the separate actors make decisions simultaneously in a
complex, iterative process. Whereas Bower’s (1970) focus is on the structural context of the firm
and its actors, Burgelman (1983) makes explicit the importance of the firm’s strategic context in
the resource allocation process. This strategic context comprises the top-down declarations of
corporate strategy as well as the individual strategic initiatives coming from the bottom-up.
Together, Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983) highlight the complex nature of identifying,
evaluating, and eventually funding the firm’s investment opportunities.
If a uni-dimensional measure does not adequately capture the complex process of
strategic capital allocation, it may misclassify an efficient internal capital market as an inefficient
one, or vice versa. Further, if managerial allocation decisions are value-maximizing, a twodimensional measure that captures a critical strategic trade-off should improve our understanding
of the association between the capital allocation process and performance. In the next section I
13

It is noteworthy that the original work of Bower (1970) was itself a response—from the perspective of corporate
strategy and business policy—to the inability of the contemporaneous economics research, which was focused
strictly on hurdle rates and the cost of capital, to capture the complexity of the resource allocation process.
Allocation decisions of multidivisional firms are not simply made in the boardroom from a list of projects ranked by
NPV, but instead are formulated on a business-by-business basis (Bower 1986).
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begin to build a new measure of capital allocation efficiency that attempts to account for these
two neglected phenomena in the literature.

Building a Measure of Capital Allocation Efficiency
In order to build a measure of capital allocation efficiency, it is first necessary to establish
the proposed construct of “efficiency.” I begin by following prior literature that classifies each
segment within multidivisional firms on the basis of its investment opportunities, which I proxy
for using Tobin’s Q.14 If the Tobin’s Q of the focal segment is higher than the asset-weighted
average Q for the rest of the firm (i.e., all segments not including the focal segment), it is
classified as having high investment opportunities. Similarly, a segment has low investment
opportunities when its Q is lower than the asset-weighted average Q of the rest of the firm.15 A
classification for return on assets (ROA), a proxy for segment performance, can be built in an
analogous manner.16 An individual segment is classified as having high (low) profitability when
its ROA is higher (lower) than the weighted-average ROA for the rest of the firm.
Next, by directly examining the cash flows (cf) and capital expenditures (capx) at the
segment level, each segment is classified as being either a subsidized segment or a transferring
segment. When the segment’s cash flow is less than the capital expenditure investment within the
segment (cf < capx), it is classified as a subsidized segment. These segments require crosssubsidizations from the firm to fund their capital investment needs. On the other hand, when the

14

Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of a firm’s market value to the book value of its assets, is a standard proxy for
the investment opportunities of the firm. Intuitively, a higher Tobin’s Q indicates higher investment opportunities; a
Tobin’s Q greater than one suggests that capital investments will yield positive returns, as measured by stock market
value.
15
Because Tobin’s Q cannot be calculated directly at the segment level, I follow Billett and Mauer (2003) in the
construction of a fitted Q, which is described in more detail in Section 4.
16
In their work, Billett and Mauer (2003) alternately use two separate proxies for the investment opportunities of the
segment, either Tobin’s Q or ROA. Their construction of internal capital market efficiency is analogous for the two
proxies, and the empirical results they present are also consistent when analyzing each proxy separately.
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segment’s cash flow exceeds that of its capital expenditures (cf > capx), it is a transferring
segment. These segments generate free cash flow that is transferred back to the firm.17
The final step in the construction of an efficiency measure of capital allocation is to
classify each segment as either efficient or inefficient. Here, a theory of strategic capital
allocation differs from prior literature.
Efficient capital allocation within the existing regime. According to the current
measures of internal capital market efficiency, segments with stronger investment opportunities
should be subsidized by those with weaker investment opportunities. Within the general
construct of efficiency outlined above, a subsidized segment is efficient (from the perspective of
prior literature in financial economics) when it has high Q. Conversely, a subsidized segment is
inefficient if it has low Q; the firm should not cross subsidize segments with weaker investment
opportunities by providing them with excess cash flow. A transferring segment (i.e., one which
generates free cash flow) is inefficient if it has high Q, because segments with stronger
investment opportunities should be reinvesting all of their cash. And conversely, a transferring
segment is efficient if it has low Q; segments with weaker investment opportunities should
transfer free cash flow back to the firm.
Efficient capital allocation within the strategy regime. This paper contends that such a
uni-dimensional proxy for internal capital market efficiency may not capture the strategic tradeoffs and complexity inherent in the resource allocation process. Specifically, a measure must
account for not only the investment opportunities of the segment, but also for its current
profitability. Based on early work by Marris (1963; 1964), I construct a simple matrix to
categorize each business segment along two dimensions: the growth potential of the business
17

Top management in the multidivisional firm has discretion to invest this excess cash in other business segments or
to make external acquisitions, to return the cash to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock buybacks, or to
simply hold the cash on the balance sheet.
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(captured by Tobin’s Q) and its current profitability (captured by ROA). The nuance here is to
capture the unique contribution of the segment’s investment opportunities in conjunction with its
current profitability. Each segment is thus classified within a 2x2 matrix as having either high Q
or low Q and either high ROA or low ROA. The remainder of the section now describes the
theory of strategic capital allocation within the construct of this matrix.18
From a strategic management perspective, an efficient transfer reallocates free cash flow
from business units with low Q and high ROA to subsidize investment opportunities in business
units with high Q and low ROA. The former is an example of a profitable segment with minimal
new growth opportunities, where additional investment of free cash flow is not expected to
deliver profitable growth. The latter segment is where the firm needs to increase investment to
establish its profitability. It is precisely these investments (in high Q and low ROA segments)
that are captured by the implications of strategic resource combinations in Rumelt (1984) and
Lippman and Rumelt (2003). Within the construct of the matrix, a transferring (subsidized)
segment with low Q and high ROA is efficient (inefficient), while a transferring (subsidized)
segment with high Q and low ROA is inefficient (efficient).
Segments with low Q and low ROA are the relatively worst performing lines of business
within the firm. They are underperforming and have minimal new growth opportunities, and by
definition, do not make compelling investments. Providing cash flow subsidies to these segments
is always considered inefficient. Within the matrix, a transferring (subsidized) segment with low
Q and low ROA is efficient (inefficient). It is important to emphasize here that all capital
18

The categorization of strategic capital allocation that I outline in this section is similar to the normative
prescriptions of the growth-share matrix originally developed in the late-1960s by the Boston Consulting Group
(BCG). In the BCG matrix, free cash flow from Cows is used to subsidize investments in fast growing Question
Marks (or Wildcats), while Stars and Dogs should be cash flow positive and self-sustaining (Henderson 1979; Stern
and Deimler 2006). A theory of strategic capital allocation may seem either self-evident or controversial for some,
because the general ideas were broached more than forty years ago. The approach adopted in this paper, while
similar to the BCG matrix, is not a direct empirical test of its prescriptions (Nippa, Pidun, and Rubner 2011; Pidun et
al. 2011).
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expenditures in a low Q and low ROA segment are not necessarily inefficient. These
underperforming segments with lower growth opportunities can still be efficient, as long as they
do not require cross-subsidizations and are generating net positive cash flow for the rest of the
firm.
The final strategic classification for high Q and high ROA segments differs from the
traditional regime and bears some additional explanation. Drawing on entrepreneurial theories of
strategy, where firms face the risk of over-investing in businesses where reinvestment rates are
higher than growth and profitability rates (Rumelt 1984), I categorize a transferring (subsidized)
segment with high Q and high ROA as efficient (inefficient). Subsidizing the high Q-high ROA
segments with excess cash flow thus represents a strategic risk of overinvestment, which may
never produce net positive cash flows. Further, the sustained success and future growth of firms
depend not only on the exploitation of their existing resources, but primarily on the development
of new resources (Wernerfelt 1984), e.g., by subsidizing the firm’s high Q-low ROA segments.
Performance based on current resources is transitory, so firms must continually invest in new
ones (Dierickx and Cool 1989), because building new strategic assets is necessary to sustain
long-term competitive advantage (Markides and Williamson 1994; Agarwal and Helfat 2009).
All of these arguments support the importance of not over-investing in the existing sources of the
firm’s current performance by subsidizing segments with high Q and high ROA.

4

METHODOLOGY
This paper compares the measurement of capital allocation efficiency under the existing

approach and a new approach grounded in strategic management. I conduct the empirical
analysis in two stages. In the first stage, I construct a two-dimensional measure of strategic
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capital allocation and carry out a behavioral test of efficiency. If this new approach captures the
strategic trade-offs faced by managers during the complex resource allocation process, I expect
to find that capital allocation is significantly more efficient than prior literature suggests. In the
second stage of the empirical analysis, I conduct a performance test of managerial investment
decisions to validate the strategic measure of capital allocation efficiency. If managers are
making this strategic trade-off in a value-maximizing manner, the strategic allocation of capital
should be positively associated with firm-level performance.

Stage 1: Behavioral Test of Strategic Capital Allocation
The behavioral test of allocation efficiency is a simple count of the inefficient segments
as determined both under the traditional regime and when employing the new, multidimensional
measure of strategic capital allocation. To compare the new approach of strategic capital
allocation against a uni-dimensional measure, I follow the prescriptions described in the previous
section to classify each segment within each firm as either efficient or inefficient. As described
above, I expect the two-dimensional measure to indicate managers are acting more efficiently
than prior measures for two reasons. First, the new measure should better capture the strategic
trade-offs faced by top-level management, and second, it should also better capture the overall
complexity of the strategic resource allocation process.

Stage 2: Validate the Measure of Strategic Capital Allocation
The validity of any new measure depends on its ability to capture and predict the
expected theoretical relationships (Venkatraman and Grant 1986). Strategic capital allocation
attempts to measure management’s ability to reallocate capital toward “winners” and away from
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“losers.” Intuitively, firms which make these value-maximizing strategic trade-offs should
perform better than those which do not. If the new measure of strategic capital allocation is valid,
it should be reflected in firm performance—the measure should be positively associated with
market value. Meanwhile, based on the extant literature, I do not expect the traditional measure
of capital allocation efficiency to show any association with firm performance. I test these
expected empirical outcomes by calculating the firm-level measure of value-added from the
internal capital market for both the traditional regime and the strategy regime.
Construction of the value-added measure. I follow Rajan et al. (2000) in calculating a
measure of value-added from internal capital market allocations for each firm in each year:
Segment Value Added =

(ROA

i ,t

− ROA−i ,t ) ∗ Amount i ,t
n

∑ TotalAssets

i ,t

i =1

The value-added measure calculates the amount (Amount) of each subsidy or transfer at the
segment level as the absolute value of the difference between the segment’s cash flows and its
capital expenditures.19 To capture the economic magnitude of the capital allocation decision for
each segment, the subsidy or transfer amount is weighted by the difference between the focal
segment’s ROA and the ROA of the rest of the firm. The whole measure is scaled by total assets
to control for firm size.
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Because a firm can only reallocate free cash flow in an amount that is actually generated by its segments, I also
follow Billett and Mauer (2003) by not allowing transfers to exceed subsidies at the firm level. Further, any cash
flow transfers must account for dividend payouts to shareholders, so an asset-allocated share of any firm-level
dividends is subtracted from the amount of each transferring segment in the firm. Formulaically, the adjusted
amount from a transferring segment is



n
PTransferi 
 ,
Transferi = min  PTransferi , n
 ∑ Subsidy i 


PTransferi  i =1
∑


i =1


where PTransferi is the potential transfer amount of segment i, measured as the positive difference between cash
flow and capital expenditures adjusted for any dividend payouts. Likewise, the Subsidyi amount is the negative
difference between cash flow and capital expenditures.
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This segment-level value is then multiplied by negative one (–1) for inefficient subsidies
and transfers (as classified for each approach in the previous section), because these managerial
decisions are assumed to detract from value-added. Finally, the firm-level value-added measure
is the aggregation of all segment-level values. The intuition behind the value-added measure
captures the basic premise that efficient allocations of capital should add to value, while
inefficient allocations should detract from it.
I calculate two value-added measures for each firm in each year. One measure follows
the uni-dimensional classification scheme for efficiency from the extant literature, while the
other follows the theory of strategic capital allocation. Note that the general method for both
calculations is exactly the same, following the process described above. Any difference between
the two approaches, then, is a result of their different classification schemes for efficiency. For
example, a subsidized segment with low ROA is inefficient when using the uni-dimensional
measure, but if the segment is low ROA and high Q the strategy regime would classify it as
efficient; it is this difference between classification schemes that will result in unique
calculations of value-added for each regime.
Empirical tests. To test the association between the value-added measures of internal
capital market efficiency, I regress firm-level performance on each measure of capital allocation
value-added:
Y j ,t = β 0+ β 1X j.t + β 2 Z j .t + ς j + γ t + ε j.t ,
where the primary dependent variable Y is the firm’s market value of equity20 and where X
indicates the separate calculations of value-added from either the traditional regime or the
strategy regime. Standard controls Z from the related literature in finance and economics are
20

I also find robust results using measures of firm-level ROA and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variables. Both of
these output variables, however, present identification issues because the classification schemes for capital
allocation efficiency require the use of both ROA and Tobin’s Q on the right-hand side of the model as well.
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employed (i.e., liquidity, leverage, the log of consumer price index-adjusted assets, and total
number of segments), and the model implements fixed-effects with firm-specific intercepts and
fiscal-year dummies. The summary statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table 1. If
the new measure of strategic capital allocation is capturing the complex, value-maximizing
trade-offs that managers face between future growth opportunities and current profitability, the
coefficient on β1 for the strategy regime should show the expected positive association with firmlevel performance, while β1 for the traditional regime should be insignificant.

Sample Description
I follow prior research on the efficiency of internal capital markets in constructing my
data sample (see, e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995, Billett and Mauer 2003, or Ozbas and Scharfstein
2010). I start with all multisegment firms between 1979 and 2009 from the Compustat Segment
File. Observations are excluded if capital expenditure data is missing or if complete data is not
available to calculate the segment’s annual cash flow using operating profit and depreciation.21 I
also collect the corresponding firm-level values from Compustat. Firms with less than $20
million in either total revenue or total assets are excluded, as are firms in the agricultural (SIC 0999) and financial sectors (SIC 6000-6999). Two years of complete data are required.
Prior literature also excludes firms where the sum of segment-level values are not within
a prescribed percentage (usually 1% or 5% for revenue and 25% for assets) of the reported
values at the firm level. The rationale is to limit observations with potential reporting errors
between segment-level and firm-level data. These differences, however, are not necessarily
indicative of reporting errors, but instead are often the natural result of managerial discretion
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Interest expense and tax expense are only recorded at the firm level. To calculate segment-level cash flow, I
follow prior literature in allocating these firm-level expenses based on the asset size of each segment.
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afforded to firms in their segment-level reporting of accounting numbers.22 The conclusions in
this paper are consistent whether these firms with differences are excluded from the sample or
not, so I report all results with the fuller data set. Similar to prior literature, I scale the amounts of
segment-level revenue and segment-level assets to match those from the firm-level report.23
The final sample from 1979 to 2009 is comprised of 89,468 segment-year observations
and 30,257 firm-year observations. By way of comparison, the sample in Billett and Mauer
(2003) ranges from 1990 to 1998, and is comprised of 5,857 segment-year observations. All of
the empirical results reported in this paper are consistent to those when I limit my sample period
and selection criteria to match Billett and Mauer (2003).24

Construction of key variables in the sample. I closely follow prior literature to construct
the primary variables for the analysis. Segment-level cash flow (cf) is calculated as the segment’s
operating profit (ops) plus depreciation (dp). I also adjust cf for the segment-level asset-weighted
average for taxes (txt) and interest (xint), since these variables are not available directly at the
segment level. Return on assets at the segment level is calculated as ops divided by its
beginning-of-period total assets (opst / at t-1).
Tobin’s Q cannot be calculated directly at the segment level because market values are
not available, so I follow Billett and Mauer (2003) in the construction of a fitted Q. First, I
calculate the Tobin’s Q of all single-segment firms (Qss) and perform separate industry-year
regressions of this Tobin’s Q on each firm’s total assets (TAss), operating profit (OPSss), and
revenue (Salesss):
22

In a current working project, Ma and Vieregger (2012) observe firms that report segment- and firm-level
discrepancies in their 10-K typically provide a descriptive rationale in the management discussion section for these
differences.
23
For example, if the sum of segment revenue is 3% less than the total of firm revenue, each segment is scaled by an
asset-weighted 3%, so the segment and firm totals match in the final analysis.
24
When I replicate the sample construction in Billett and Mauer (2003), I have 6,418 segment-year observations.
The small difference is likely due to changes in the Compustat Segment File over the years.
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Q ss , j ,t = β 0 + β 1TAss ,t + β 2 OPS ss ,t + β 3 Sales ss ,t ,
where j is the two-digit SIC industry of the single-segment firm and t is the fiscal year.25 Next, I
use these industry-year coefficient estimates to predict a fitted Tobin’s Q at the segment level,
based on the actual assets, profitability, and revenue of each segment:
Qˆ i ,t = βˆ0 + βˆ1TAi ,t + βˆ 2 OPS i ,t + βˆ3 Salesi ,t .
The result is a fitted Q for each segment within the sample of multidivisional firms.26 This
estimation approach endeavors to reduce the measurement error inherent in using single-segment
peers as a proxy for the Q of individual segments in a multi-segment firm.

5

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical analysis in this paper considers the measurement of capital allocation

efficiency based on both extant theory and the principles of strategic management. The first stage
of the analysis compares the efficiency of segment-level allocations using the uni-dimensional
measure developed in Billett and Mauer (2003) against a new, multidimensional measure of
strategic capital allocation. In the second stage, I attempt to confirm the validity of the new
measure of strategic capital allocation.

Stage 1: Behavioral Test of Strategic Capital Allocation
The results from the first test are presented in Table 2. Column A is a simplified
reproduction of the original results from Billett and Mauer (2003).27 They find that firms are
25

These firm-level characteristics represent the key data available for segments in the Compustat Segment File. TA
is the log of CPI-adjusted total assets. OPS and Sales are scaled by total assets.
26
The fitted Q is truncated if it is larger (smaller) than the maximum (minimum) of the Tobin’s Q from the industryyear regression from the first step.
27
In their paper, Billett and Mauer (2003) present these results within categories based on the financial constraints
of each segment. I merely condense those results here.
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allocating capital efficiently at the segment level only 24% of the time, and their results are
consistent whether alternately using Tobin’s Q or ROA as the proxy for investment
opportunities.
Column B corroborates these results using the much larger sample in this paper.28 Similar
to Billett and Mauer (2003), I show that a uni-dimensional measure for internal capital markets
finds efficient allocation only 27% of the time. It is compelling that these results are consistent
over the complete time period in this paper, from 1979 to 2009. Equally important, the
replication of these results also finds that 55% of segments are subsidized segments (compared to
57% in Billett and Mauer 2003), while the remaining 45% are transferring segments (compared
to 43%). I conclude that my replication is accurate.
Next, I evaluate internal capital market efficiency following the principles of strategic
management, as detailed in Section 3. Column C of Table 2 shows the main results from the first
stage of the empirical analysis. Compared to the uni-dimensional measure employed in Columns
A and B, I find that firms allocate capital efficiently 53% of the time under a strategic measure of
capital allocation efficiency—more than twice as often than under the current approach. The
results suggest that managers do face a strategic trade-off between current profitability and future
growth opportunities during the resource allocation process. The failure to account for these
trade-offs, which have been neglected in prior literature on the resource allocation process,
significantly increases the appearance that firms are allocating capital inefficiently at the segment
level.
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The sample size in this paper is much larger than in Billett and Mauer (2003) due to two factors. The first is the
longer timeframe (1979-2009 compared to 1990-1998). The second reason is described in detail in the sample
description; the sample in this paper does not drop observations where segment-level aggregations of revenue or
assets differ from those of firm-level reports. The results in this paper are consistent when the sample size matches
that in Billett and Mauer (2003) and when the observations with assumed discrepancies are also dropped.
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Stage 2: Validate the Measure of Strategic Capital Allocation
In the behavioral test above, I find that managers appear to allocate capital significantly
more efficiently when the analysis accounts for both current profitability and future growth
opportunities. In the second stage I attempt to validate these results by testing the association of
strategic capital allocation with firm-level performance. If the new measure of strategic capital
allocation is capturing the complex, value-maximizing strategic trade-offs managers face, the
measure should show a positive association with performance.
Table 3 presents the main results for the test of validity. Models 1-4 are baseline tests for
the association between the uni-dimensional measure of internal capital market efficiency and
market value. As expected, the coefficients in Models 1-4 demonstrate that a the existing
measure need not show a significantly positive association with firm performance. The results
are comparable to those in Billett and Mauer (2003), who find that the overall measure of valueadded is not significantly different from zero in their tests of excess value. They also show that
firms only create value by making efficient transfers to segments that are otherwise financially
constrained, a key idea behind internal capital market efficiency from a finance perspective.
Models 5-8 in Table 3 demonstrate that the new measure of strategic capital allocation
efficiency appears valid. While the results presented here use the market value of equity as the
dependent variable, similar results are obtained when using ROA and Tobin’s Q as proxies for
firm-level performance. Models 5 and 6 show a significantly positive association between the
value-added measure of strategic capital allocation and the market value of equity. The one-year
lag on the measure of value-added from strategic capital allocation in Models 7 and 8 is also
significant, suggesting an important relationship between the value-maximizing strategic trade-
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offs that managers face today and firm-level performance in the future. This result is consistent
with long-term performance implications of strategic capital allocation decisions.
To investigate these long-term implications more explicitly, I perform additional tests of
the association between the value-added measures of efficiency and firm-level performance. As a
way to capture the cumulative value of prior investment decisions, I sum the value-added
measure across multiple years for each firm to create new explanatory variables for both
regimes. I calculate cumulative value-added for three years and for five years in each regime.
The results from these tests are presented in Table 4, and they provide strong evidence for the
long-term importance of strategic trade-offs faced by managers. Consistent with the main
regression results above, Models 1-3 show that the value-added measure from the extant
approach is not significant in any tests. In Models 4-6, however, the measure of strategic capital
allocation is significantly associated with firm performance at three and at five years. The
strategic implications of capital allocation decisions appear to be important for up to five years
following management’s original investment decision.

6

CONCLUSION
The capital allocation process is a critical component of strategic execution for

multidivisional firms. Chandler (1962) goes so far as to define strategy in terms of the resource
allocation process, and many others have explicitly recognized capital allocation decisions as the
most important component for the success of multidivisional firms (Williamson 1975; Bower
1970; Rumelt 1984; Bardolet et al. 2011). Despite this importance, strategy scholars have ceded
much of the theoretical and empirical work in capital allocation efficiency to the domains of
finance and economics (Stein 2003). The bulk of this research (Lamont 1997; Shin and Stulz
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1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru
2007; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010), as well as the evidence from prominent field studies in
strategic management (Christensen and Bower 1996; Sull 1999), concludes that managers make
significantly inefficient capital allocation decisions—a result that should be of concern to
business managers and strategy scholars alike.
This paper asks whether managers are truly allocating capital so inefficiently, or do they
instead have rational, strategic objectives that explain their investment decisions. Building off the
general framework of internal capital market efficiency from financial economics (Berger and
Ofek 1995; Rajan et al. 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003), this paper develops a new measure of
strategic capital allocation. The new approach introduces a multidimensional measure to capture
the strategic trade-offs between future growth and current profitability (Marris 1963; Marris
1964; Williamson 1964), which are faced by managers during the complex resource allocation
process (Bower 1970; Burgelman 1983). In the first stage of the empirical analysis, managers are
found to be allocating capital more than twice as efficiently than prior literature suggests. The
second stage validates this multidimensional approach by demonstrating the predicted theoretical
relationship between a strategic measure of capital allocation and firm-level value, namely, that
managers appear to be capable of enhancing performance through strategic capital allocation.
One limitation of the research design in this paper is that a normative link between capital
allocation efficiency and firm-level performance requires the researcher to prescribe a definition
of efficiency. While little theory exists, I attempt to mitigate some concern by drawing on the
established precepts of the resource-based theory of the firm (Wernferfelt 1984; Dierickx and
Cool 1989; Rumelt 1994; Markides and Williamson 1994; Lippman and Rumelt 2003; Agarwal
and Helfat 2009). I further attempt to moderate the normative limitations of this approach in
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Stage 2 of the empirical analysis. By demonstrating the consistency of the value-added measure
of strategic capital allocation with its theoretical predictions, the results here validate the new,
multidimensional of strategic capital allocation. Considering the significance of the results,
however, additional large-scale and industry-specific empirical work may still be necessary to
bolster our understanding of strategic capital allocation.
This paper makes two important contributions, which I will explore in turn for the
remainder of this paper. First, the paper investigates a fundamental component of strategic
management theory and practice—the efficiency of a firm’s internal capital allocation
processes—that has been largely neglected by strategy scholars of late. The third contribution is
of paramount importance for the practice of strategy: the results in this paper provide insight for
managers on how to create value through strategic capital allocation.
Because of the importance of internal capital market efficiency to strategic execution
(Chandler 1962; Williamson 1975; Bower 1970), this paper endeavors to establish that the an
influential research agenda on the resource allocation process should once again be driven by
scholars from the strategy disciplines. We know that managers make strategic trade-offs in the
complex process of resource allocation, but prior examinations of capital allocation efficiency
have neglected to consider the impact of these trade-offs.29 We also know that resource
allocation within the multidivisional firm is a complex, multilayered process (Bower 1970),
formulated not only by top-down declarations of corporate strategy but also by bottom-up
strategic impetuses (Burgelman 1983). An appreciation for these strategic trade-offs and
complexities, as well as the managerial biases inherent in them (Garbuio et al. 2011; Bardolet et
al. 2011), may yield further insights into strategic capital allocation.

29

Porter (1996) argues that managing complex trade-offs between strategic activities is the very essence of strategy.
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A second contribution from this paper is of practical concern to top management teams
responsible for their firms’ capital allocation decisions. Recent articles in practitioner-oriented
journals, such as the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Pidun et al. 2011) and McKinsey
Quarterly (Hall et al. 2012), highlight the importance of the resource allocation process to toplevel management teams. The new measure of strategic capital allocation in this paper builds on
the extant empirical results, following a interdisciplinary, integrative approach (Jemison 1981) to
research, which is important for business managers. Nearly three decades ago, Bettis (1983, 414)
wrote:
Relevant results from modern financial theory should be incorporated into the strategic
management literature, and conversely. … Ultimately such a synthesis is essential, or else
practitioners will be forced to select among contradictory paradigms—a most undesirable
circumstance.

Despite the importance of the resource allocation process to practitioners, the bulk of research in
both strategy and financial economics has accepted the paradigm (Kuhn 1962) that top-level
managers of multidivisional firms quite regularly misallocate capital resources. This paradigm of
inefficiency has driven a research agenda that focuses on managing agency costs in order to limit
either the ignorance or malfeasance of managers. The results in this paper, however, suggest that
managers may indeed be able to create value through the resource allocation process, and future
research should seek to explore theories of how managers can best improve performance through
strategic capital allocation.
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Table 1: Data Correlations

ICM
Lag ICM
SCA
Lag SCA
Liquidity
Leverage
Log Assets
Segments

ICM

Lag ICM

SCA

Lag SCA

Liquidity

Leverage

Log Assets

Segments

1.000
0.760
0.021
0.035
-0.058
-0.022
0.024
-0.050

1.000
0.069
0.199
-0.087
-0.023
0.011
-0.050

1.000
0.596
0.014
0.028
-0.016
0.064

1.000
0.035
-0.007
-0.013
0.056

1.000
-0.296
-0.073
-0.031

1.000
0.078
-0.050

1.000
0.030

1.000

ICM = Value Added Measure of Internal Capital Market
SCA = Value Added Measure of Strategic Capital Allocation
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Table 2: Stage 1 Empricial Results

Efficient Subsidized
Inefficient Subsidized

Column A
B&M (2003) ICM
Segments
Percentage
850
25%
2502
75%

Column B
ICM Replication
Segments
Percentage
14776
30%
34676
70%

Column C
Strategic Capital Allocation
Segments
Percentage
11225
23%
38227
77%

Total Subsidized

3352

57%

49452

55%

49452

55%

Efficient Transferring
Inefficient Transferring

573
1932

23%
77%

9457
30559

24%
76%

36524
3492

91%
9%

Total Transferring

2505

43%

40016

45%

40016

45%

Total Efficient Segments
1423
24%
24233
27%
47749
53%
Total Inefficient Segments
4434
76%
65235
73%
41719
47%
Total Segments
5857
100%
89468
100%
89468
100%
Column A is a condensed version of Table 2 from Billett and Mauer (2003). Column B replicates the finance ICM measure using the larger
sample size in this paper. Column C presents the capital market efficiency based on the strategic capital allocation.
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Table 3: Stage 2 Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Firm Market Value

ICM Value Added

[1]

[2]

0.083
(0.063)

-0.034
(0.055)

Lag of ICM Value Added

[3]

[4]

-0.089
(0.072)

-0.184**
(0.078)

SCA Value Added

[5]

[6]

0.216*
(0.124)

0.278**
(0.133)

Lag of SCA Value Added

[7]

[8]

0.238**
(0.117)

0.193**
(0.094)

Liquidity

0.004
(0.011)

0.007
(0.013)

0.004
(0.011)

0.007
(0.013)

Leverage

-1.411***
(0.094)

-1.400***
(0.106)

-1.412***
(0.093)

-1.396***
(0.106)

Log of CPI Adj. Assets

0.681***
(0.025)

0.709***
(0.028)

0.682***
(0.025)

0.708***
(0.028)

No. of Segments

0.022**
(0.010)

0.025**
(0.011)

0.022**
(0.010)

0.026**
(0.011)

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed-Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6.463***
(0.029)

2.083***
(0.194)

6.561***
(0.047)

1.742***
(0.202)

6.463***
(0.029)

2.079***
(0.194)

6.563***
(0.047)

1.750***
(0.202)

30257

29485

25223

24563

30257

29485

25223

24563

0.305
0.436
0.324
0.457
0.305
All standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

0.437

0.324

0.457

Constant

N
R2

41

Table 4: Long-term Implications of Capital Allocation Decisions
Dependent Variable = Firm Market Value
[1]
ICM 1-Year

[2]
ICM 3-Year

[3]
ICM 5-Year

[4]
SCA 1-Year

[5]
SCA 3-Year

[6]
SCA 5-Year

-0.034
(0.055)

-0.053
(0.046)

-0.039
(0.043)

0.278**
(0.133)

0.156**
(0.068)

0.160**
(0.075)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed-Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2.083***
(0.194)

1.886***
-0.285

2.367***
-0.37

2.079***
(0.194)

1.897***
-0.285

2.390***
-0.37

29485

17526

12184

29485

17526

12184

Value-Added Measures

Constant

N
R2

0.436
0.45
0.448
0.437
0.45
All standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Regressors for ICM and SCA are the summation of either 3-years or 5-years of value-added from capital market efficiency.
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Chasing their Tails: Why Do Firms Subsidize Underperforming Business Units?

Abstract
Firms repeatedly fail to exit from underperforming lines of business. Despite the prevalence and
economic import of this failure to exit, scant empirical research explores the managerial motives
of delayed exit. To address this question, I build a novel sample of underperforming business
units that are being cross-subsidized by the internal capital market of conglomerate firms. Within
this sample, firms repeat their subsidizing investments approximately 48% of the time, and the
average length of cross-subsidization is an additional 5.6 years. In the main test of the paper, I
examine the extent to which these seemingly inefficient investment decisions are driven by
perceived synergies between the firm’s business units. While I do find evidence that synergies
may provide a strategic rationale for the prevalence of cross-subsidization, managers are
ultimately not enhancing firm-level performance via these synergistic investment decisions.
Additional tests suggest that hubris and escalation of commitment may be playing a more
significant role.
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INTRODUCTION
Firms repeatedly fail to exit from underperforming lines of business. Elfenbein and Knott (2011),
for example, find that nearly 50% of exit occurs more than three years after an economicallymodeled threshold would predict. In another study, 65% of divestitures resulting from external
pressures were only executed after long delays and in the face of persistent underperformance
(Dranikoff, Koller, and Schneider 2002). Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991) demonstrate that
managers delay exit until the business unit has significantly underperformed for as many as
seven years, and Caves (1998) finds that these divestitures tend to occur at the bottom of
macroeconomic business cycles. More recently, Brauer and Wiersema (2012) find that exiting at
the peak of a divestiture wave, i.e., when the decision is likely to be imitative of competitors,
generates the lowest stock market returns. Practitioner anecdotes of delayed exit are also
plentiful (e.g., Horn, Lovallo, and Viguerie 2006). In the strategic management literature, Sull
(1999) details how Firestone Tire and Rubber subsidized its bias tire production during the
1970s, even though the market was disappearing and the business was losing money. He
concludes: “Although the motives for delaying exit may have been admirable, the financial
results were disastrous” (Sull 1999, 448).
Considering the prevalence and economic import of the problem, scant empirical research
has been conducted to understand the managerial motives of delayed exit.30 In a comprehensive
review of the literature on divestment, Brauer (2006, 775) specifically calls for research on the
“potentially anomalous cases” of delayed divestment, where firms fail to exit their
underperforming business units. Elfenbein and Knott (2011), as noted above, is an exception.
They decompose rational versus behavioral effects on organizational delay to find evidence that,

30

I purposely distinguish here between traditional research on the divestment decision, which I will review briefly in
the next section, and research on the delayed divestment of underperforming business units.
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while a portion of delay is rational, the behavioral biases of managers play a significant role in
the decision to delay exit. These biases are exacerbated by separated ownership and control.
Anecdotal conclusions from practitioner journals often find similar results, explaining failure to
exit as a result of the psychological biases of managers not willing to “let go” of failing
businesses (Horn et al. 2006). Likewise, the predominant conclusion from the literature on
internal capital markets is that firms consistently make inefficient investment allocation
decisions (see Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo 2011 for an example and a review of the literature).31
In this paper, I integrate the literature of divestitures with that of internal capital markets to
examine whether managers are instead following a rational strategy of delayed exit—making
repeated, cross-subsidizing investments in underperforming business units, in an attempt to
exploit synergies that can create returns to scale or scope.
To examine the question of delayed exit, I begin by constructing a novel sample of
underperforming business units that are also being repeatedly cross-subsidized via the internal
capital market of diversified firms. A business unit is cross-subsidized when its capital
investments exceed its internally generated cash flows because, as standalone firms, these units
would likely need access to prohibitively expensive external markets for this additional
financing.32 I use a competing hazards model to estimate the likelihood of exit within this
sample. In addition to the primary exit event, the competing hazards model can account for
contingent events, which allows me to also control for the efficient re-allocation of capital that
may precede exit. My primary variable for the strategic rationale of delayed exit is the
relatedness between the subsidized business unit and other units within the firm, drawing on the

31

Vieregger (2012) is an exception.
External capital is likely to be prohibitively expensive for these business units precisely because they are
underperforming and have minimal growth opportunities. They lack cash flow to support new debt payments and are
unlikely to attract equity capital either.
32
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general interindustry relatedness index from Bryce and Winter (2009) to construct a proxy for
synergy.33
This sample of capital investment decisions, examined from within the firm’s internal
capital market, provides a compelling setting to examine why firms fail to exit their
underperforming business units. Within the sample, the probability of repeating a crosssubsidizing investment from one year to the next is approximately 48%, which is the secondmost persistent type of conglomerate investment. On average, these firms then continue to crosssubsidize the underperforming business for another 5.6 years. My main results show that firms
are significantly more likely to continue their cross-subsidization of an underperforming business
unit when that unit is highly related to another unit within the firm. Controlling for potential
explanations that may be related to structural-economic and managerial-agency antecedents of
divestiture, I conclude that managers may be delaying exit in order to maintain synergies
between their business units. In a final test, however, I demonstrate that these “synergistic”
cross-subsidizations are not associated with increased performance at the firm-level.
These results suggest that managers are overestimating the potential for synergies as a
basis for their internal investment decisions. Roll (1986) draws a similar conclusion in his
investigation of corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). He defines the hubris hypothesis as
the willingness of bidders to pay more than market price for acquisitions, primarily because they
believe in potential synergies. The ex-post empirical evidence demonstrates that synergies often
fail to generate value, and that acquiring firms, on average, pay too much for their targets. One
explanation for this evidence is the inherent information asymmetry in the M&A setting. The
bidder must derive a value for the target based on incomplete information, incorporating the

33

I am thankful to Professor Bryce for making the full dataset of relatedness percentiles and z-scores available to
me.
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“estimated economies due to synergy” (Roll 1986, 199), and these estimates can ultimately lead
to valuation error and takeover premiums. The problem of information asymmetry, however,
should be significantly less prominent for the internal investment decisions studied in this paper,
so the prevalence of inefficient cross-subsidizations is particularly striking here.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. I begin by summarizing the antecedents of
divestiture from prior literature and then introduce a theoretical background of exit delay. Next, I
describe my sample and empirical approach, before presenting the main results. I conclude in the
final section.

PRIOR LITERATURE
Divestitures include the spin-offs, carve-outs, sell-offs, and shuttering of individual business
units by conglomerate firms. Regardless of their size and scope, divestitures constitute “a crucial
element in the continuum of governance modes” for all firms (Lee and Madhavan 2010, 1345).
Yet, as described above, firms repeatedly delay exit. To understand the potential drivers of the
seemingly-inefficient exit delay documented in the academic and practitioner literature, I build
on Porter (1976) to classify the antecedents of divestiture within three theoretical constructs:
structural-economic; managerial-agency; and strategic. These antecedents form the basis for the
examination of delayed exit, and I will now review each in turn.

Structural-economic
Structural-economic factors comprise the economic characteristics of an industry or
macroeconomic environment that may compel a conglomerate to delay exit, even when the
business unit is earning a rate of return below its cost of capital. Two prominent factors in the
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divestiture literature are environmental uncertainty and technological change. Damaraju, Barney,
and Makhija (2011) consider the decision to divest from the perspective of real options theory
(Tong and Reuer 2007) and hypothesize that environmental uncertainty increases the value of
real options for divestiture. In this case, it may be optimal to retain a business unit when the
current value of that unit is unknown (Li et al. 2007). Under conditions of high uncertainty, they
find supporting empirical evidence that firms are more likely to delay exit. On the other hand,
Bergh and Lawless (1998) hypothesize that firms may be more likely to divest under conditions
of environmental uncertainty because they are unable to effectively manage their diverse
business units. Using a measure of uncertainty based on the volatility of industry sales, they
conclude that divestitures are sensitive to environmental uncertainty for the highly diversified
firms in their sample. Similarly, Chatterjee, Harrison, and Bergh (2003) and Bergh (1998) find
that environmental uncertainty spurs divestment activity, which in turn affects firm performance.
Technological change can also influence divestment decisions. If firms fail to keep pace with
either operating efficiencies or innovative developments, they may face higher rates of
obsolescence, and thus be forced to exit sooner, when technological change is high (Harrigan
1982; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994).34 This effect is not always consistent, though, because
high technological change in the form of environmental turbulence can enhance firm competence
and result in a decision to delay exit (Tushman and Anderson 1986).

34

Other industry-specific antecedents of divestiture, such as industry concentration and growth, business lifecycle
and competitive intensity, come from the fields of industrial economics and organizational ecology (e.g.,
Ilmakunnas and Topi 1999). Brauer (2006) summarizes these factors and concludes that they are considered less
important for divestment research today.
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Managerial-agency
Managerial-agency factors are characterized by principal-agent theory, where delayed
exit may be exacerbated by ineffective corporate governance and misaligned managerial
incentives. According to an agency theory of investment, managers have incentives to diversify
because growth increases their power (Jensen 1986). Effective corporate governance, then, is
necessary to limit managerial malfeasance by aligning incentives between the internal and
external capital markets (Walsh and Seward 1990). To be sure, weak internal governance is often
blamed for overdiversification in the first place (e.g., Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt 1993;
Hoskisson and Turk 1990; Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel 1994), where overdiversification is
defined as growth beyond the optimal level for shareholders (Markides 1992). To cite one
example in particular, Hoskisson and Turk (1990) find that poor corporate monitoring and
inadequate compensation schemes lead to higher levels of product-market diversification.35
Behavioral biases need also be curbed by corporate governance, lest managers delay exit either
as a result of their unwillingness to admit past investment mistakes (Ravenscraft and Scherer
1987; Boot 1992) or their escalation of commitment to an underperforming business unit (Staw
1981; Ross and Staw 1993).

Strategic
Strategic antecedents of divestiture are primarily concerned with the interrelatedness of
the various businesses within the conglomerate firm. According to Teece’s (1982) economic

35

The finance literature also examines the value-reducing effects of overdiversification. Lang and Stulz (1994), for
example, show that Tobin’s q and diversification are negatively related, suggesting that firms are overdiversifed.
Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1995) find evidence that diversified firms have values that average approximately 15%
below the sum of the imputed values of the individual business units. In more recent work, Hoechle, Schmid,
Walter, and Yermack (2012) conclude that this “diversification discount” is at least in part the consequence of
agency problems and poor corporate governance.
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theory of the multiproduct firm, managers should allocate internal capital resources toward
businesses that are related functionally, technologically, or geographically, i.e., toward
investment opportunities where the managers exhibit a relative advantage based on tacit yet
transferable organization knowledge.
Empirically, the results are decidedly mixed. Consistent with theory, some research finds
that acquisitions of unrelated business units underperform (Chatterjee 1986; Chatterjee 1992;
Singh and Montgomery 1987) and are subsequently divested (Duhaime and Grant 1984;
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987).36 Likewise, refocusing on the core business of the firm by
reducing the level of unrelated diversification tends to increase market value (Markides 1992;
Markides 1995). Other studies, however, find that related acquisitions do not create more value
than unrelated ones (Lubatkin 1987; Seth 1990; Matsusaka 1993), and that the outperformance
observed in other settings may be a function of market structure as opposed to the relatedness of
the diversification (Christensen and Montgomery 1981). Issues of relatedness measurement are
also important (Robins and Wiersema 2003). Another explanation for these mixed results may
also be the important distinction between the concepts of relatedness (i.e., the similarity between
firms) and complementarity (i.e., the valuable combination of differences between firms), in
particular when considering strategic and market factors (Harrison et al. 1991; Kim and
Finkelstein 2009).
The research examining relatedness and exit also finds mixed results (Ravenscraft and
Scherer 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach 1992; Sharma and Kesner 1996; Chang and Singh 1999;
Shimizu 2007; O’Brien and Folta 2009). In a meta-analysis, Lee and Madhavan (2010) find no
statistically significant evidence that relatedness acts as a moderator between divestiture and

36

An important component of diversification and divestiture is also the origin of the business unit in question, e.g.,
whether it was developed internally or acquired (Karim 2006; Karim 2009).
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subsequent performance. To explain these contradictory results, Lee, Folta, and Lieberman
(2012) contend that relatedness can simultaneously both enhance the chance of survival (via
synergies) and increase the rate of exit (via the ability to redeploy resources). None of these
studies, however, examines the role of strategic relatedness within the context of delayed exit
decisions, which is an important contribution of this paper.

THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The foundation of divestiture research is naturally rooted in the economics of acquisitions and
diversification. Since at least Penrose (1959), scholars have recognized that economies of scale
and scope can foster sustained competitive advantage for conglomerate firms. Management seeks
to fully employ its indivisible resources as a “jig-saw puzzle,” where the relevant pieces include
products, markets, and production technologies (Penrose 1959, 69). More formally, firms
efficiently diversify via economies of scope when the joint production of two or more outputs is
less than the cost of producing each separately (Panzar and Willig 1981). These unit-cost
economies are only valuable for conglomerates when managers utilize proprietary knowhow
(i.e., organization knowledge) across indivisible and specialized assets for production (Teece
1980). Further, it is in related lines of business where these economies of scope are likely to be
maximized, in part due to the commonality of knowhow and assets across businesses (Teece
1982).37
An assumption underlying much of the early empirical research on divestitures is that
exiting a business unit implies the management team made an investment mistake (Boot 1992).
As noted in Brauer (2006), though, recent practitioner surveys indicate that senior managers

37

Teece (1982) does point out that unrelated diversification may be valuable when the conglomerate’s internal
capital market can assess and select efficient investment opportunities (Williamson 1975).
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consistently view divestitures as purposeful and strategic options, and as deliberate means to
enhance firm value (KPMG 2002; Accenture 2003).38 By creating more efficient uses of firm
resources, and by enabling the firm to regain competitiveness, divestitures can be a critical part
of strategic growth for conglomerate firms (Berry 2009). Indeed, just as divestiture can be seen
as a strategic option, so too can the decision to delay divestiture. Divesting business units that
possess valuable yet tacit resources, such as those found in legacy lines of business, may even
impair operating performance if managers do not accurately assess the interrelatedness of the
divested unit to the rest of the firm (Feldman 2011). Firms may also delay divestiture if
diversification is undertaken as a process of searching for valuable matches between related
resources, and the uncertainty of this experimentation takes time for management to resolve
(Matsusaka 2001).
Business-unit synergies may motivate a rational decision to delay exit and can take on
two different forms. In the first type of synergy, scale/scope economies result when business
units share a common resource whose unit-cost decreases with scale. Accordingly, marginal cost
in the primary business unit would increase following a divestiture of the related unit. An
alternative form of synergy is demand complementarity, where revenues for one business will
increase when revenues increase in a related unit.39 In both cases, the decision to delay exit may
ultimately be profit maximizing. By cross-subsidizing the underperforming business unit, the
firm is in effect maintaining the synergistic relationship to the benefit of the firm as a whole.
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An academic survey of CEOs by Hamilton and Chow (1993) finds that the desire to reverse management’s
investment mistakes was only the 10th-ranked motive for the decision to divest. Other important motives for
divestiture include the desire to focus on core business activities (2nd-ranked), the desire to shift resources to
business units with higher growth opportunities (5th-ranked), and a desire to avoid the high investment needs of the
divested business unit (9th-ranked).
39
The methods based on relatedness in this paper will pick up effects from the first form (scale/scope economies)
but may miss effects from the second (complementarities) if no other firms within the interrelatedness index also
exhibit the exact nature of the complementarity.
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Where no synergies exists, Brauer and Wiersema (2012, 1474) succinctly capture the
economic importance of the efficient divestment of underperforming business units: “According
to transaction costs economics and resource-based theory, divestitures can result in better
resource utilization and the removal of negative synergies or diseconomies of scale and scope
across the firm’s portfolio, thus leading to value creation.” The decision to delay exit, then, has
significant economic implications. In this paper, I examine cases where firms delay exit from
underperforming business units and investigate whether business-unit synergies provide a
strategic rationale for these seemingly inefficient capital allocation decisions.

METHODOLOGY
Research setting
For the conglomerate firm, the decision to divest a business unit is conducted by top
management within the context of an “internal capital market,” where business-unit managers
compete for firm investment (Chandler 1962; Williamson 1970). Research in strategic
management recognizes the importance of a strategic allocation process for the efficient
allocation of these scarce resources (Williamson 1975; Bower 1970; Lippman and Rumelt
2003).40 While some strategy authors in the divestment literature address this link (e.g.,
Hoskisson and Turk 1990; Liebeskind 2000), the bulk of empirical work on allocation efficiency
at the business unit-level has been carried out in the financial economics literature (see Stein
2003 for a comprehensive review). The overwhelming conclusion from this research is that firms
do not allocate capital efficiently (e.g., Lamont 1997; Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes, and
Zingales 2000; Billett and Mauer 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru 2007; Ozbas and Scharfstein
40

Chandler (1962, 16) defines strategy in terms of the resource allocation process: “Strategy can be defined as the
determination of the basic long-term goals” of the firm, as well as “the allocation of resources necessary for carrying
out these goals.”

53

2010). By connecting these two literatures explicitly, the research setting in this paper allows me
to investigate the capital allocation decisions for each business unit at a micro-level. Within the
internal capital market of the firm, I am able to examine when managers choose to crosssubsidize underperforming business units, i.e., the actual decisions that result in delayed exit.

Sample and data
The sample includes all publicly-traded firms in the Compustat Segment database from
1979 to 2009. Following prior literature (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000; Billett and
Mauer 2003) and the approach developed in Vieregger (2012), each unit is categorized along two
dimensions: profitability (ROA) and investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q). If the ROA (Tobin’s
Q) is higher than the asset-weighted average ROA (Tobin’s Q) for the rest of the firm (i.e., all
business units not including the focal unit), the unit is classified as having high performance
(high investment opportunities). Likewise, a business unit has low performance (investment
opportunities) when its ROA (Tobin’s Q) is lower than the asset-weighted ROA (Tobin’s Q) of
the rest of the firm. To identify the relatively worst performing business units for use in this
paper, I focus on the subsample of units that simultaneously have a lower ROA and a lower
Tobin’s Q than the rest of the firm.
Next, I identify whether the business unit is being cross-subsidized by the firm’s internal
capital market. By directly examining the cash flows and capital expenditures at the businessunit level, a business unit is being cross-subsidized when its capital expenditures exceed the
amount of its internally generated cash flow. These business units require additional cash flow
from the firm’s internal capital market to fund their investment needs. Because business units
with simultaneously low ROA and low Tobin’s Q are the relatively worst performing in the firm,
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they do not represent a compelling source for profitable investments. As such, providing cash
flow subsidies to these segments is considered inefficient, and a repeated pattern of crosssubsidization implies a management decision to delay exit.41
For a business unit to be included in the final sample for this paper, I require it to be both
underperforming and cross-subsidized for at least two consecutive years. Firms may engage in
diversification as a search process that requires experimentation (i.e., entering new lines of
business and observing the results) to resolve uncertainty (Matsusaka 2001). This
experimentation may take the form of cross-subsidizing an underperforming business unit in the
short-run, because management needs time to assess the value of its investment decision. By
repeatedly deciding to cross-subsidize that unit, however, I assume that management is no longer
“searching,” but is instead investing in the underperforming business unit for other reasons,
either rational or not. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of data events for the sample, resulting in
11,128 business unit-year observations.
Table 1 characterizes the level of investment and divestiture behavior of the full sample.42
As indicated above, each business unit is categorized based on its ROA and Tobin’s Q, in
addition to whether it is being cross-subsidized. The transition matrix here presents the
probabilities that any one investment type will transition from one state to another, from one year
to the next, where the rows indicate the number and percentage for each type of transition. As
can be seen along the diagonal of the matrix, the most likely outcome for any investment type is
to perpetuate it. This effect is most-pronounced for cross-subsidizing the worst underperforming
41

It is important to emphasize that all investments in these relatively worst performing business units are not
necessarily considered inefficient. As long as they do not require cross-subsidizations, these business units, while
underperforming, are still generating net positive cash flow for the rest of the firm. These investment decisions are
thus considered efficient.
42
The full sample from 1979 to 2009, before sorting based on the relative ROA and Tobin’s Q, is comprised of
89,468 business unit-year observations, where 25,498 (28.8%) are both underperforming and cross-subsidized for at
least one year during the sample period.
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(LQ-LR Sub = 47.7%) and not subsidizing the best overperforming (HQ-HR = 51.8%)
categories; the probability that other investment types persist is between 19.9% and 35.2%.
Nearly half of the time, a firm that cross-subsidizes an underperforming business unit will repeat
that investment during the next year.43 By itself, the fact that investments in the worst
underperforming units are as likely to persist as investments in much better performing ones (and
more likely than all others) is compelling. It is precisely these investments that I examine in the
remaining empirics.

Estimation approach
I implement a competing hazards model to estimate the instantaneous probability of exit,
given that either (i) no exit has occurred or that (ii) the firm has not decided to re-allocate its
capital resources.44 Traditional hazard analysis, as used in prior literature, would only estimate
the probability of exit under the (false) assumption that firms do not change their allocation
decisions from one period to the next. Within the context of an internal capital market, however,
a firm can decide to reduce its investment in an underperforming business unit, such that the
business unit is no longer being cross-subsidized.45 In this case, it is no longer as critical for the
firm to consider exiting the unit, even if the unit continues to be underperforming, because it is
now generating net positive cash flows. While the traditional hazard model would conflate both
exiting and re-allocating as the same event, a competing hazards model can capture the
alternative event of re-allocating resources away from the underperforming business unit.

43

It is also interesting to note that the probability of exiting the worst underperforming investments is not
significantly higher than exiting any other, better-performing investment; the probability of exit for all units,
regardless of performance or investment opportunities, is approximately between 21% and 23%.
44
In STATA, competing hazards analysis is carried out with the -stcrreg- command. As of version 11.1, the
command did not offer an option to fit the model in the accelerated failure-time (AFT) method.
45
The performance of the business unit could also improve.
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Formally, the model estimates the competing hazard rates of whether the firm exits the
business unit or efficiently alters its investment decision via the re-allocation of capital. The
instantaneous transition rate is defined as:

rk (t ) = l im

∆ →0

Pr( t ≤T < ( t + ∆t ), D = k |T ≥t
∆t

,

where k refers to either exit or re-allocation as outcomes in D. The decision to exit is the focal
event; re-allocation is the competing event. The probability Pr describes the likelihood of
experiencing one of the mutually exclusive outcomes during the time interval from t to (t + ∆t),
conditional on still being at risk, where T is the total time at risk. Similar to standard survival
analysis, each transition rate is specified using the Cox proportional hazard model:
rk (t ) = r0 (t ) exp( βX),
where X is my vector of covariates, which are described in detail in the next section. To interpret
the results, a positive (negative) coefficient on the estimated parameter β means that the variable
of interest leads to a faster (slower) occurrence of the focal event, which in this case is exit. If
relatedness is a strategic rationale for delayed exit, I would expect to find a negative coefficient
on my proxy for synergy, i.e., where higher relatedness delays exit.

Variables
To test the proposition that firms may have a strategic rationale for delaying exit, I make
use of the Bryce and Winter (2009) interindustry relatedness index to develop my proxy for
strategic relatedness.46 The index provides a percentile relatedness rank for every possible dyad

46

In their original research, Bryce and Winter (2009) demonstrate the construct validity of their interindustry
relatedness index for manufacturing firms; I find consistent results in this paper using both their full sample and a
manufacturing sample.
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of business units based on 4-digit SIC industries, calculated as the likelihood distance between
two different units. To construct my measure of strategic relatedness, I compare the dyad score
of the underperforming business unit against each of the other business units within the firm, and
I record the highest dyad score for the unit. This measure captures the maximum level of unit-tounit relatedness for that firm’s underperforming business unit, which I then use as my proxy for
synergy between units. The key advantage of this measure is that it is based on the strategic
relatedness of business units (Markides and Williamson 1994).47
To control for other potential drivers of (and barriers to) divestiture, I include measures
for the structural-economic and managerial-agency antecedents, as discussed in the theory
section above. For structural-economic factors, I follow Bergh and Lawless (1998) and Bergh
(1998) in constructing a proxy for environmental uncertainty, measured as the 5-year volatility of
industry-wide sales for each firm (Snyder and Glueck 1982). To control for technological change
related to process efficiency improvements, I follow Harrigan (1982) in calculating a
technological scale effect as the ratio of gross PP&E to the number of employees. Firms that
cannot match increases in scale will face unit-cost disadvantages and be expected to divest their
underperforming business units sooner. To capture the role of innovative technological changes,
I also control for industry-adjusted R&D intensity, measured as R&D over sales less the
corresponding 2-digit SIC mean.
Managerial-agency variables for the monitoring and control of managers imply that
weaker governance structures result in greater agency problems (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker 1999). These control variables include board size, where a larger board is considered
less effective (Jensen and Yermack 1996); the proportion of independent directors as a proxy for
47

In a robustness check on the measure of relatedness, discussed in the results section, I also examine the
relationship between the business unit and the core business of the firm as a whole. The results from these tests are
inconsistent, providing further support for the use of Bryce and Winter’s (2009) strategic measure of relatedness.
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board independence (e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Yermack 1996;
Pfeffer 1989); and the separation of Board Chairman and CEO to measure the level of CEO
influence on the board. Managerial-agency variables for the incentive alignment between
managers and shareholders also aim to decrease agency effects. These control variables include
the percentage of long-term compensation for the CEO (e.g., Anderson, Bates, Bizzok, and
Lemmon 2000) and CEO tenure, which can either proxy for CEO entrenchment or the likelihood
that a new CEO will exit the underperforming businesses previously favored by a predecessor.
I also include financial control variables for the return on assets (ROA) of both the
business unit and firm, because prior research has shown that each is an important antecedent of
divestiture (Dranikoff et al. 2002; Duhaime and Grant 1984; Harrigan 1981; 1982; Markides
1992; Montgomery and Thomas 1988; Pashley and Philippatos 1990; Chang 1996; Duhaime and
Grant 1984; Hamilton and Chow 1993; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel 1996; Hoskisson
and Johnson 1992). The control variables are developed from various databases, including
ExecuComp (1992-2009), the RiskMetrics Directors File (1996-2006), and Thompson
Financial/CDA Specturum. Once all controls are included, the subsample from 1996 to 2006
includes a total of 629 unique business units, with 272 exit events and 175 re-allocation events.48
The large number of re-allocation events provides further support for the importance of using a
competing hazards model in this analysis. Because these subjects are considered over time, these
units combine for 1,344 business unit-years at risk. Table 2 lists the univariate statistics and
correlations of the variables.

48

The remaining 182 subjects are right-censored.
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RESULTS
When all controls are included in Model 3 of Table 3, the coefficient on the maximum
relatedness variable of BWI Max Relatedness is –1.181, and it is highly significant. Because the
dependent variable is probability of exit, the interpretation of the result is that the likelihood of
exiting the underperforming business unit decreases as its maximum relatedness to other
business units increases. Greater relatedness between business units leads to more, repeated
cross-subsidizing of underperforming business units. An increase of one standard deviation in
the level of relatedness decreases the likelihood of exiting that business unit in the next period by
7.5%. The coefficients for the structural-economic and managerial-agency antecedents are
generally insignificant but still consistent with expectations of divestiture theory. Firm-level
ROA and business unit-level ROA are both negative and significant as expected; firms delay exit
as performance increases. Introducing controls for divestiture antecedents limits the sample
period to years 1996-2006, so Model 4 estimates the BWI Max Relatedness measure without
controls for the years 1980-2009. The relatedness coefficient is smaller but still negative and
highly significant.

Are these investments efficient?
The very premise of this analysis is that repeatedly cross-subsidizing the firm’s worst
underperforming business units is an inefficient investment decision. However, given that these
investments appear to be supported by a strategic rationale related to business unit synergy, it is
possible that classifying the investment decision as inefficient would be a mistake. By crosssubsidizing the underperforming business unit, firms may in fact be contributing synergies to
other business units, either by lowering the scale economies of shared resources or by increasing
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demand complementarities. In this case, making repeated cross-subsidizing investments would
not be a case of delayed exit but would instead be profit maximizing.
To examine the overall effectiveness of these investment decisions, I extend the analysis
in Vieregger (2012) by establishing a counterfactual investment efficiency schema. In the
original schema, each business unit within the conglomerate firm is categorized as either
efficient or inefficient, based on its current performance (ROA) and growth opportunities
(Tobin’s Q), as well as whether it is being cross-subsidized (i.e., its capital expenditures exceed
its internally generated cash flow) via the internal capital market of the firm. As described above
in the Sample section, a business unit has either high or low performance and high or low growth
opportunities, relative to whether its ROA or Tobin’s Q is higher or lower than the weightedasset average of the rest of the firm. Subsidizing business units is inefficient when they have high
ROA-high Q, high ROA-low Q, and low ROA-low Q (as in the sample of this paper). Under the
counterfactual schema, I instead assume that cross-subsidization is actually an efficient allocation
of capital resources when the low ROA-low Q business unit is highly related to another within
the firm (see Figure 2). In the results reported here, highly related is defined as a Max
Relatedness BWI score that is greater than the median.49 The remainder of the new schema
follows Vieregger (2012) in every other way, such that I am isolating the decision to crosssubsidize these relatively worst performing business units.
Next, I follow Rajan et al. (2000) to calculate the firm’s value-added from capital
allocation in each year, which captures the overall efficiency of the internal capital market:
Value Added =

(ROA

i ,t

− ROA−i ,t ) ∗ Amount i ,t
n

∑ TotalAssets

i ,t

i =1

49

Robustness checks not tabulated here show that increasing or decreasing the cut-off criterion for highly related
does not affect the tenor of the results.
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For each business unit, the value-added measure calculates the amount (Amounti,t) of the crosssubsidy or transfer (i.e., the amount that cash flow exceeds capital expenditures), weighted by the
relative ROA of the focal unit (ROAi,t – ROA-i,t) and scaled by firm total assets (TotalAssetsi,t).50
Finally, the firm-level measure is the sum of all business-unit measures, where the value-added
of inefficient business units is multiplied by negative one (–1), because these managerial
decisions are not value enhancing. I calculate the value-added for each firm in each year, both for
the original schema in Vieregger (2012) and the counterfactual schema based on efficient
synergistic investments in this paper. The two measures will thus only vary when the firm makes
a cross-subsidizing investment in a highly related business unit.
Model 1 in Table 3 matches the results first reported in Vieregger (2012), where the firmlevel measure of value-added is positively and significantly associated with market value.51
Firms that follow the original schema appear to be enhancing firm value. If, on the other hand,
firms are enhancing value by cross-subsidizing their underperforming but related business units,
I would expect the coefficient in Model 2 of Table 3 to be significantly greater than that from the
original schema. Instead, Model 2 shows that the coefficient on the value-added measure from
the counterfactual schema is smaller (0.014) and no longer significantly associated with market
value. These results suggest that, while firms may indeed be following a strategic rationale when
making these cross-subsidizing investment decisions, the decisions themselves do not appear to
enhance firm performance. Cross-subsidizing these underperforming business units via an
internal capital market is in fact inefficient.

50

Weighting by ROA controls for the economic magnitude of the cross-subsidy or transfer.
Robustness checks show that value-added is also strongly associated with other measures of performance, such as
ROA and Tobin’s Q.
51
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What is driving these inefficient investments?
Additional analysis suggests that the inefficient pattern of cross-subsidizations observed
in this paper reflects an escalation of managerial commitment to the underperforming business
unit (Staw 1976; Staw and Ross 1978). Recall that business unit-observations enter the sample of
delayed exit when a firm makes two consecutive cross-subsidizing investments in one of its
relatively worst underperforming units. To test the likelihood of entering into this sample, I
create a binary variable that captures whether a firm decides to initiate the cross-subsidization of
an underperforming business unit. The variable is set equal to one (1) if the business unit is
underperforming and the firm initially decides to cross-subsidize it; if the firm decides to not
cross-subsidize an underperforming business unit, the binary variable is set equal to zero (0).
Using this binary variable of the decision to initiate cross-subsidization as the dependent
variable, Table 5 shows the probit analysis including all controls for the 1996-2006 sample,
matching the competing hazards model above. The coefficient on BWI Max Relatedness is not
significantly different from zero, suggesting that relatedness does not influence the firm’s
likelihood of entering into a cross-subsidizing and underperforming investment.52 The only
significant coefficient is on the ROA of the business unit, which is highly negative as expected;
the lower the ROA of the unit, the less likely is the firm to subsidize it.
These results are interesting because my proxy for synergy appears to play an
asymmetrical role in the investment decision. Faced with the decision of whether to crosssubsidize an underperforming business unit, the firm is not motivated by the relatedness of the
unit in initiating the investment (i.e., making it for the first time); however, given that a crosssubsidizing investment has been made for two consecutive years (as in the main result above),
52

If I eliminate the control variables to expand the sample size (not tabulated), the coefficient on BWI Max
Relatedness becomes significantly negative, suggesting that increased synergy may actually decrease the likelihood
of initiating an inefficient investment decision.
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relatedness plays a highly significant role in continuing that investment. Once the firm has
committed to the cross-subsidization of an underperforming business unit, it will escalate that
inefficient investment for an average of another 5.6 years.
Further evidence suggesting an escalation of commitment to the underperforming
business unit comes from the variable for CEO tenure, which is the only significant control in the
original model from Table 3. A one standard deviation increase in the tenure of the CEO
decreases the likelihood of exiting the underperforming business unit in the next period by
almost 14%. In other words, newer CEOs are significantly more likely to exit underperforming
businesses, suggesting that they are immune to any commitment that was previously driving the
continuation of the inefficient investment.
To further test the role of CEO tenure in influencing an escalation of commitment, I use
the Wilcoxon test to compare the survival functions of new CEOs against CEOs with longer
tenure. The Wilcoxon test is a nonparametric rank test similar to the log-rank test, which
tabulates the expected number of exits for each group and compares them against the observed
number of exits.53 If new CEOs are more likely to exit underperforming business units, the
Wilcoxon test should reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the new CEOs is
the same as that of longer-tenured CEOs. The results are consistent with these expectations.
Whether CEOs are identified as “new” during their first year (Pr>chi2 = 0.0568) or during their
first two years (Pr>chi2 = 0.0028), both tests demonstrate significantly different hazard functions
across new and not-new CEOs. In other words, newer CEOs do not demonstrate a commitment
to continue inefficient investments in underperforming business units.
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The Wilcoxon test is constructed in the same way as the log-rank test, but I do not expect the hazard functions to
vary proportionally over time, i.e., more firms will exit at earlier analysis times. The Wilcoxon test also assumes that
the censoring patterns do not differ among the test groups. I achieve consistent results using both tests.
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Robustness checks on relatedness
As a robustness check on the validity of the proxy for synergy employed for the main
results of this paper, I follow prior convention in examining the relationship between the
business unit’s industry and the core industry of the firm. I classify a business units as “core” if
its segment SIC industry is the same as that of the primary SIC industry for the firm as a whole; I
create three separate binary variables (one each for the 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit SIC industries)
where the variable is equal to one (1) if the business unit shares the same SIC industry as the
firm. If these SIC-based indicators are valid, I would expect the survivor functions of the core
business units to vary significantly from those of the non-core units; similar to the results from
the relatedness variable developed in this paper, I would expect firms to cross-subsidize the core
business units longer than the non-core.
I formally test the equality of the survival function for the core versus non-core business
units by using the Wilcoxon test, described above. If the SIC-based indicators for core business
units are valid, the Wilcoxon test should reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of
the core group is the same as the non-core group. However, the chi-squared from each of the
three different SIC equality tests provides inconsistent results. Only the 2-digit SIC industry
demonstrates significantly different hazard functions across core and non-core (Pr>chi2 =
0.0003), while the tests for 3-digit (Pr>chi2 = 0.4930) and 4-digit (Pr>chi2 = 0.7863) are
insignificant. These inconsistent results suggest that, only when core is broadly defined at the 2digit SIC industry, does it influence the cross-subsidization of underperforming business units.
Finally, I also test the BWI Max Relatedness measure by comparing the survivor functions of
units with high relatedness against those with low relatedness, based on median scores.
Consistent with the conclusions in this paper, the chi-squared results indicate that the survival
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function for highly related business units is significantly different from that of lowly related ones
(Pr>chi2 = 0.0000).
In further checks (not tabulated here), I calculate the entropy measure of diversification,
developed by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and Palepu (1985), and re-estimate the competing
hazards model. I substitute the BWI Max Reldatedness variable with the three separate measures
of entropy, total diversification (DT), related diversification (DR), and unrelated diversification
(UR). While these measures are calculated at the level of the firm, and as such are not perfect
substitutes for a business unit-level of synergy, they still represent traditional means to evaluate
the diversification strategy of conglomerates. In my tests, none of the entropy coefficients are
significant, but their signs were in expected directions. DT and DR were negative and
insignificant, while DU was positive and insignificant; as the related diversification strategy of
the firm increases, I would expect its likelihood of delayed exit to increase as well.
The insignificance of the entropy signs, as well as the inconsistent results from the SICbased hazard ratios for core/non-core business units, provide additional support for the proxy of
synergy developed in this paper. The use of strategic measures of relatedness, such as one
developed from the Bryce and Winter (2009) index, is critical when examining the strategic
decision to delay exit.

CONCLUSION
Inefficient subsidies of underperforming business units represent the second-most persistent type
of investment in firms, where the rate of persistence (48%) is nearly as high as that for efficient
transfers from the high performing units (52%). This paper examines why firms are making such
inefficient investments. I find first that a dominant rationale appears to be the relatedness
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between business units. The main results from my proxy of business unit synergy indicate that
the likelihood of exiting an underperforming business unit decreases as its maximum relatedness
to other business units within the firm increases. One conclusion is that firms may believe that
exiting these business units would result in increasing scale economies or decreasing
complementarities, thus reducing market value. To examine whether firms may in fact be acting
optimally by subsidizing these underperforming business units, I examine the impact on market
value. The results for a counterfactual analysis, where these cross-subsidizing investments in
highly related business units are considered efficient, does not find support for the idea that firms
are creating value. Indeed, these subsidizing investments do appear to be inefficient.
This logic resembles Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis, where firms are overestimating the
value of synergy in the mergers and acquisition (M&A) process. In the case of M&A activity, the
hubris result is not necessarily surprising because a significant amount of information asymmetry
can exist between the bidder and the target, leading to valuation errors. Within the internal
capital market of a conglomerate firm, however, the result is indeed surprising. The firm should
have access to detailed and accurate information on its business units and resources. They also
have operating results. Additional tests on the decision to initiate a cross-subsidizing investment
suggest that escalation of commitment may be driving these repeated, inefficient investment
decisions.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Data Events for the Sample

Figure 2: Original and Counterfactual Schema for Underperforming Business Units
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Table 1: Transition Probability Matrix from Year n to Year n+1
Year n+1
Exit

Year n

LQ-LR Sub
(Inefficient)

5,425
23.3

LQ-LR Sub
(Inefficient)
11,128
47.7

LQ-HR Sub
(Inefficient)

908
22.1

775
18.8

818
19.9

672
16.3

224
5.5

71
1.7

293
7.1

334
8.1

18
0.4

4,113
100.0

HQ-HR Sub
(Inefficient)

2,186
20.6

1,013
9.6

699
6.6

3,732
35.2

1,090
10.3

73
0.7

243
2.3

1,487
14.0

75
0.7

10,598
100.0

HQ-LR Sub
(Efficient)

2,623
23.5

2,436
21.8

228
2.0

926
8.3

3,521
31.6

214
1.9

142
1.3

688
6.2

382
3.4

11,160
100.0

LQ-LR Trans
(Efficient)

1,244
21.0

941
15.8

53
0.9

69
1.2

192
3.2

1,858
31.3

527
8.9

619
10.4

436
7.3

5,939
100.0

LQ-HR Trans
(Efficient)

1,433
20.8

516
7.5

355
5.1

274
4.0

155
2.3

410
5.9

1,896
27.5

1,743
25.3

122
1.8

6,904
100.0

HQ-HR Trans
(Efficient)

4,892
20.8

872
3.7

383
1.6

1,674
7.1

705
3.0

552
2.4

1,690
7.2

12,180
51.8

565
2.4

23,513
100.0

HQ-LR Trans
(Inefficient)

725
20.9

312
9.0

33
1.0

69
2.0

328
9.4

455
13.1

137
3.9

632
18.2

785
22.6

3,476
100.0

19,436
21.8

17,993
20.2

3,256
3.7

8,305
9.3

8,523
9.6

4,744
5.3

5,429
6.1

18,602
20.9

2,743
3.1

89,031
100.0

Total

LQ-HR Sub
(Inefficient)
687
2.9

HQ-HR Sub
(Inefficient)
889
3.8

HQ-LR Sub
(Efficient)
2,308
9.9

LQ-LR Trans LQ-HR Trans HQ-HR Trans HQ-LR Trans
(Efficient)
(Efficient)
(Efficient)
(Inefficient)
1,111
501
919
360
4.8
2.2
3.9
1.5

Total
23,328
100.0

The transition matrix presents the probabilities that any one investment type will transition from one state to another, from
one year to the next, where the rows indicate the number and percentage for each type of transition. Business units are
categorized based on their performance (ROA) and investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) relative the asset-weighted amounts
for the rest of the firm as a whole: L = low; H = high; Q = Tobin’s Q; R = ROA; Sub = Cross-subsidizing investment (where
capital expenditure exceeds cash flow); Trans = Transferring (where cash flow exceeds capital expenditure).
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Table 2: Data Summary and Correlations
1 Unit ROA (%)
2 Firm ROA (%)
3 Independent Directors (%)
4 No. of Directors (log)
5 CEO is Chairman
6 CEO Tenure (log)
7 CEO Long-term Incentives (%)
8 R&D Intensity
9 Technological Scale (log)
10 Max Relatedness

Obs
1344
1344
1344
1344
1344
1344
1344
1344
1344
1344

Mean
0.011
0.104
0.681
2.294
0.206
8.266
0.372
0.005
5.075
0.146

SD
0.188
0.087
0.164
0.234
0.405
0.675
0.288
0.023
1.276
0.054

Min
-3.310
-0.352
0.000
1.386
0.000
4.277
0.000
-0.268
1.210
-1.284

Max
0.462
0.866
0.933
3.219
1.000
9.978
1.000
0.073
8.839
0.182

1
1.000
0.151
0.030
0.103
-0.141
-0.001
0.051
0.033
-0.002
0.043
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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
0.047
-0.005
-0.015
0.030
0.197
-0.031
-0.102
-0.020

1.000
-0.006
-0.120
-0.211
0.160
-0.027
0.054
0.025

1.000
-0.138
-0.107
0.085
-0.009
0.189
0.053

1.000
-0.152
-0.115
-0.077
0.004
-0.034

1.000
-0.119
0.029
0.005
-0.016

1.000
-0.057
0.025
0.036

1.000
-0.033
-0.002

1.000
-0.037

1.000

Table 3: Competing Hazards Regression Analysis
Focal Event:
Competing Event

[1]
Exit
Re-allocation

BWI Max Relatedness (Synergy)
Structural-Economic Controls
Environmental Uncertainty
Technological Scale
Industry-Adusted R&D Intensity
Managerial-Agency Controls
Board Size
Independent Directors
CEO is Board Chairman
CEO Long-term Compensation
CEO Tenure
Firm-level ROA
Business Unit-Level ROA

Calendar-Year Dummies
No. of Subjects
No. of Exit Events
No. of Competing Events (Re-allocation)
No. Censored
Observations
Time-at-Risk
Log Pseudolikelihood
Wald chi2
Prob > chi2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[2]
Exit
Re-allocation

[3]
Exit
Re-allocation

[4]
Exit
Re-allocation

-1.058***
(0.252)

-1.129***
(0.383)

-0.933***
(0.237)

-0.359
(0.435)
0.045
(0.055)
-2.672
(2.317)

-0.400
(0.441)
0.045
(0.055)
-2.819
(2.341)

0.094
(0.292)
-0.178
(0.370)
0.031
(0.162)
0.236
(0.239)
-0.174**
(0.087)
-1.034
(0.719)
-0.949***
(0.179)

0.093
(0.290)
-0.131
(0.375)
0.011
(0.164)
0.233
(0.239)
-0.171*
(0.087)
-1.072
(0.724)
-0.937***
(0.179)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

629
272
175
182
1344
1344
-1309.23
134.43
0.0000

629
272
175
182
1344
1344
-1321.29
97.49
0.0000

629
272
175
182
1344
1344
-1308.13
142.66
0.0000

4716
2781
1316
619
15233
15233
-21270.62
685.63
0.0000
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Table 4: Comparison Between Original and Counterfactual Schemas
Dependent Variable = Log of Firm Market Value
Original
Schema
[1]

Revised
Schema
[2]

0.278**
(0.128)

0.014
(0.057)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed-Effects

Yes

Yes

2.141***
(0.198)

2.146***
(0.198)

30209

30209

0.436

0.435

Value-Added

Constant

N
R2

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Probit Analysis
Dependent Variable = Initiating Investment
BWI Max Relatedness (Synergy)
-0.368
(0.556)
Structural-Economic Controls
Environmental Uncertainty
-0.377
(0.253)
Technological Scale
0.034
(0.034)
Industry-Adusted R&D Intensity
2.023
(1.469)
Managerial-Agency Controls
Board Size
-0.118
(0.163)
Independent Directors
-0.096
(0.274)
CEO is Board Chairman
-0.049
(0.102)
CEO Long-term Compensation
0.070
(0.148)
CEO Tenure
-0.039
(0.064)
Firm-level ROA
1.452
(1.120)
Business Unit-Level ROA
-4.277***
(1.060)
Constant
1.419**
(0.719)
Observations
Pseudo R2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

83

1339
0.0646

Managerial Foresight and Corporate Investment

Abstract
Managers generate value through the implementation of unique strategies. We argue that
managers exhibit foresight when they make unique investment decisions today that deliver
above-normal returns in the future. The main objectives of this paper are to define a theory of
managerial foresight and to introduce a new measure that captures foresight. We also highlight
the characteristics of managers and firms that appear to exhibit foresight.
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“We’re happy to be once again a large owner of a business with both unique assets and
outstanding management.” — Warren Buffett, 1995 Letter to Shareholders

foresight (n): the ability to predict what will happen in the future; prescience

1. Introduction
Managers generate value through the implementation of unique strategies (Litov, Moreton, and
Zenger 2012). Whether via the acquisition of new businesses, the construction of new plants, or
the research and development of new drugs, all strategies that require the investment of capital
resources are carried out within strategic factor markets (Barney 1986). These markets are
necessarily imperfect, because managers faced with uncertainty and ambiguity will develop
varying expectations about the future value of particular strategies (Demsetz 1973; Lippman and
Rumelt 1982; Barney 1986; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Indeed, some managers will exhibit
foresight—the ability to make unique investments today that deliver above-normal returns in the
future—by exploiting the imperfections in strategic factor markets. Leaving aside luck as an
explanation, this foresight is primarily driven by the proprietary insights that managers possess
about the firm’s accumulation of strategic capabilities and assets (Dierickx and Cool 1989),
which can ultimately lead to the establishment of competitive advantages for the firm (Barney
1991; Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005; Kunc and Morecroft 2010). This paper outlines a theory of
managerial foresight and introduces a new measure to identify managers who exhibit this
foresight.54 We contend that foresight leads to unique investment decisions, i.e., investments that

54

Ahuja et al. (2005, 793) have called for more research into the theory and empirics of managerial foresight:
“Accordingly, the question of how much foresight managers actually have seems to be fairly important for the
strategic management literature.”
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are not immediately recognized by the firm’s competitors or the external capital market in
general. It is these unique strategies that can generate above-normal returns.

2. Setting
The setting for our investigation of managerial foresight is the capital investment decisions of
firms. A large and significant literature on the association between corporate investment and
internal cash flow concludes that firms typically overinvest and may destroy value by doing so
(see Stein 2003 for a review in the financial economics literature). Conversely, some firms
exhibit what in retrospect appears to be foresight in their investment decisions. For example,
Costco Wholesale Corp. made large investments in growth and expansion during the mid-1990s,
investments that set the foundation of its profitable trajectory even through today. Other firms
that made seemingly-large investment decisions during the mid-1990s include Circuit City
Stores Inc., Target Corp., and Lowe’s Companies Inc.—all of which enjoyed stock market
appreciation during the period. Appendix A provides a short analysis of managerial foresight in
the retail industry starting in 1996.
In order to study managerial foresight, we need to provide a definition: managers with
foresight make unique investment decisions today that deliver above-normal returns in the
future. We operationalize uniqueness by examining the levels of investment which deviate from
the expectations of the external capital market. The investigation of investment levels is
important because the market often penalizes firms when they invest either too much (e.g., by
overexpanding) or too little (e.g., by holding large cash reserves). An example of the former case
comes from Amazon, which is constantly reinvesting significant sums of its retained earnings.
Even after its Q3 2011 results were reported in line with market expectations, the company’s
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stock was pounded after executives announced they would be investing more to support the longterm growth prospects of the company.55 An example of the latter case is Apple. Management at
Apple is often criticized (and is currently being sued) for not returning more of its cash hoard to
investors.56 Because of this penalty for underinvesting and overinvesting, firms should only
pursue investment levels that deviate from market expectations when they have a compelling
strategic rationale for doing so.
Our definition of managerial foresight thus requires a theory of market expectations.
Conceptually, we define underinvestment as investing less than an expected level, while
overinvestment is investing more. Empirically, we employ residual analysis to measure
investment deviation as a function of the market’s expectations of investment, derived from three
components: the firm’s current investment level; its market-to-book ratio; and a market-based
prediction of investment, which is derived from industry regression analyses. Other approaches
to measure deviation include examining the level of investment greater than (or less than) an
industry average (e.g., Campbell et al. 2011), or the use of proxies for managerial
optimism/overconfidence, based on option holding or insider buying patterns (e.g., Malmendier
and Tate 2005). We employ the residual approach because it enables us to make firm-level
predictions of investment levels and calculate the deviation from expected levels directly.57
Some firms exhibiting foresight will deliver above-normal returns through competitive
advantages because they possess and accurately utilize their proprietary information (Dierickx
and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005). This information allows managers to
exploit imperfections in strategic factor markets by investing either less (underinvesting) or more

55

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/business/at-amazon-jeff-bezos-talks-long-term-and-meansit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
56
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-26/too-much-cash-isnt-good-for-apple
57
Some limitations of the approach are considered in the concluding section.
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(overinvesting) than is currently expected by the external capital market (Demsetz 1973;
Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Barney 1986; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Underinvesting with
foresight allows firms to avoid losses by abstaining from value-destroying investment
opportunities, while overinvesting with foresight allows firms to more fully exploit growth
opportunities. Because these investment levels are not anticipated by the external capital market,
firms with foresight can earn above-normal returns from their more accurate expectations of
return potential (Barney 1986).58
Distinguishing between foresight and luck within this context is critical yet perhaps
empirically impossible: “Our guess is that whatever the formal approach, two of the ubiquitous
tools in capital budgeting are a wing and a prayer, and serendipity is an important force in the
outcome” (Fama and French 1997, 179). Barney (1986) also recognizes that the attainment of
competitive advantages may merely be the result of a firm’s good fortune and luck. Indeed,
without a theory of managerial foresight, the sources of competitive advantage would be
indistinguishable from luck (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005). The preliminary approach presented in
this paper makes no special claim to resolving the confounding factor of luck, but we do
recognize its vital importance to the interpretation of our empirical design and results.

2.1 Prior Empirical Literature
Starting with Barney (1986), the establishment of competitive advantage has long relied on the
theoretical concept of foresight. Despite this importance, scant research has attempted to identify
cases of managerial foresight empirically. This section provides a brief overview of one
empirical study related to our work here.

58

We employ industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) to proxy for returns. We will discuss the empirical approach
and its limitations in the next section.
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Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005) examine whether managers have foresight to identify their
key patents ex ante, and the authors look at insider trading patterns as a signal of this foresight.
They point out that, while foresight is necessary for rent accumulation (absent luck), managers
may use the information asymmetry inherent in this foresight to appropriate rents for themselves
at the expense of shareholders. Empirically, they show that insider purchases by senior managers
increase in the number of patents, as well as with patent activity in the year before, during, and
after the patent application is filed. These results suggest that managers do exhibit foresight
related to patents and that they trade on this proprietary information. Ahuja et al. (2005) do not,
however, examine whether managers actually increase wealth as a result of their insider trades.

3. Empirical Design
The sample includes all firms from Compustat that make capital investments (capx) and have
complete data for our analysis between 1996 and 2006.59
We employ residual analysis to categorize the investment decisions of firms based on
their deviation from expectations of the external capital market (Richardson 2006; Biddle,
Hilary, and Verdi 2009). Residual analysis enables us to capture firm-level deviations from the
expected level of investment, which is estimated from a market-based regression model. The
expected level of investment from this approach will vary over time and thus reflect the
influence of industry-wide economic conditions during the year.
In the first step, we regress firm-level investment on the firm’s market-to-book ratio at
the beginning of the period, which is our measure of the market’s expectation of the firm’s

59

Note that some of our analysis requires data in year t+3, so we also use forward data from 2007 to 2009 for return
on assets (ROA).

89

investment opportunities.60 No other control variables are included in the first-stage regression
because the impact of these effects will be investigated in the second stage.

I i ,t = β 0 + β 1 MTBi ,t −1 + ∑ YearIndicator + ∑ IndustryIndicator + ε i ,t

I is firm i’s investment level (capx) scaled by the beginning assets in year t, and MTB is firm i’s
market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year. This first-stage regression is estimated crosssectionally for each industry-year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry
classification.61 Each industry must have a minimum of 20 firm-year observations in each given
year. Then, using the firm’s market-to-book ratio, we calculate the expected level of investment
(I-hat) as a function of the estimated industry-year coefficient on MTB for each firm’s industry.
Iˆi ,t = β 0 + ( β j ,1 ∗ MTBi ,t −1 )

And finally, the deviation from market expectations (i.e., the residual, I-tilda) is calculated as the
difference between the firm’s actual level of investment during the year (I) and the predicted
level (I-hat).
~
I i ,t = I i ,t − Iˆi ,t

To classify firms as either overinvesting or underinvesting, we split the sample of firms
into quartiles based on the magnitudes of their residuals (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). We
sort firms yearly based on the residuals and classify the bottom (top) quartile as firms that are
60

Biddle et al. (2009) find consistent results when they use either Tobin’s Q or sales growth (both together and
separately) as their proxy for investment opportunities in the market model.
61
Fama and French (1997) start with 4-digit SIC industries and develop a classification system with 48 industries.
One objective of the approach is to more accurately estimate the cost of equity for industries. The classification
system is widely used in asset pricing, corporate finance, and economics. See Wulf (2002) for its use in the context
of internal capital markets.
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underinvesting (overinvesting), such that the most negative (positive) residuals are classified as
underinvesting (overinvesting). The investment levels of firms within the two middle quartiles
are considered to be consistent with the expectations of the capital market. This group constitutes
the firms at the benchmark investing level.
In our preliminary analysis, we examine the profitability of the firm’s investment as a
measure of the rents accruing to the firm, using industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) as the
proxy. For each firm, we compare its industry-adjusted ROA during the year of investment
against its industry-adjusted ROA three years hence. For a firm to exhibit above-normal returns,
we require that the industry-adjusted ROA in t+3 is both positive (i.e., higher than the industry
average for that year) and increasing (i.e., the firm’s ROA in t+3 is higher than its ROA in t).62
In our empirical design, then, managers exhibit foresight when the firm’s investment
level deviates from market expectations (i.e., the firm is either underinvesting or overinvesting
according to the market model) and its investments yield above-normal returns in the future (i.e.,
ex post future industry-adjusted ROA is both positive and increasing). We provide univariate
summary statistics in the next section.

4. Descriptive Statistics
A primary objective of this paper is to examine the prevalence of foresight and the characteristics
of firms exhibiting such foresight.

62

Of course, using ROA is not without concerns. Another approach to measure the above-normal returns of the firm
might be its cumulative abnormal returns based on stock price. We discuss the advantages and limitations of both
measures more fully in the concluding section of this paper.
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4.1 Data Summary
The full sample from 1996 to 2006, which is used in the first-stage regression to estimate
industry-year levels of expected investment, is comprised of 75,163 firm-year observations (see
Table 1). Our sample is further limited by the number of firms that do not contain data for ROA
in t+3, so the main sample of analysis contains 54,573 firm-year observations.63 The annual
number of firm-year observations is relatively stable throughout the ten-year sample period, and
the individual years for 1996 and 2006, as well as for the retail industry (Fama-French industry
42), are also presented in Table 1.64
--------------------------------------Insert Table 1 About Here
--------------------------------------Figure 1 depicts histograms of the residuals for various samples.65 The top two
histograms show the distribution of residuals for the full years, separately, of 1996 and 2006.
Both appear to be approximately normally distributed, although they also both exhibit a longer
tail to the right. The value at the 99th percentile is farther away from zero than that of the 1st
percentile (see Table 1). While the mean for each year is zero, the medians residuals for both
years are negative. The bottom two histograms show the distribution of the retail industry (FamaFrench industry 42) in 1996 and 2006. Again, the distribution for the retail industry in 1996
appears generally normal (with a longer tail to the left), but for 2006 the retail industry definitely

63

Firms that do not contain data in t+3 can be said to have “exited” the sample. These firms may exit for any
number of reasons, which may be both positive or negative for the firms, and accretive or dilutive for shareholders.
In subsequent tests, we will also consider the characteristics of these exiting firms.
64
In the Appendix, we provide a short analysis of managerial foresight in the retail industry as of 1996.
65
In all histograms, the data beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles have been removed for presentation purposes. I do
not drop the outliers from the overall analysis because a test of deviation is in some ways an examination of outliers.
Table 1 lists the 1st and 99th percentiles because they capture the general tenor of the data more accurately than the
minimum and maximum values.
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shows a block pattern distribution between -0.05 and -0.01. A large number of firms appear to be
underinvesting in this particular industry-year sub-sample.
--------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 About Here
--------------------------------------To categorize firms as either underinvesting or overinvesting, the full sample is split into
quartiles based on the magnitude of residuals. Firms are sorted annually; the bottom quartile (i.e.,
the most negative residuals) are the underinvesting firms and the top quartile (i.e., the most
positive residuals) are the overinvesting firms. After splitting the sample based on quartiles,
18,798 (25%) firms are categorized as underinvesting; 18,784 (25%) as overinvesting; and
37,581 (50%) are considered to have investment levels consistent with market expectations (see
Panel A of Table 2).
--------------------------------------Insert Table 2 About Here
--------------------------------------From Table 1, we also see that the median residual for the full sample is -0.017, suggesting that
on average firms appear to be underinvesting relative to market expectations. The residuals at the
1st percentile (most negative) and 99th percentile (most positive) are -0.315 and 0.548. The 25th
percentile-split for underinvesting comes at -0.040; the 75th percentile-split for overinvesting
comes at 0.012.
Because we use a strict line to separate the sample into three groups, one concern is
whether these categories are actually different from each other. In order to examine the sample
mean between two or more groups, we use one-way analysis of variance with the Bonferroni
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multiple-comparison test to reduce bias from multiple groups (see Table 3).66 The sample mean
of the residual for the benchmark category (-0.02) is significantly larger (p=0.000) than the
sample mean of the residual for the underinvesting category (-0.13). Likewise, the sample mean
of the residual for the overinvesting category (0.16) is significantly larger (p=0.000) than the
sample means for both the benchmark and the underinvesting categories. We conclude that the
three categories of residuals capture distinct subsets of the data.
--------------------------------------Insert Table 3 About Here
--------------------------------------As discussed above, we lose observations when determining managerial foresight
because the analysis requires the firm to have ROA at t+3. As a result, we can categorize
foresight for 54,573 firm-year observations (see Panel B of Table 2). Within this sample, the
quartile split for deviation from expected levels of investment also changes, but only slightly.
The middle two benchmark quartiles, which originally comprised 50%, now increases to 50.9%
of the sample. The underinvesting category decreases to 23.5% of the sample, and
overinvestment increases to 25.6%. It thus appears that underinvesting firms are slightly less
likely to survive to t+3, while overinvesting firms are slightly more likely. We do not believe
these changes introduce any significant bias into the results. Figure 2 presents some evidence as
to why underinvesting firms are less likely to survive, as the median firm-level ROA at time t for
the underinvesting firms that exit is negative and significantly smaller than all other categories.
These underinvesting firms are already struggling with lower ROA at the start of the analysis
period. For all of the exit categories, the firm-level median ROA is lower at the start of the
analysis period.
66

The command for oneway analysis of variance in Stata is -oneway-.
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--------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 About Here
--------------------------------------Within the sample as a whole (see Panel C of Table 2), which includes all firms that exit
from the sample due to data limitations, we find that approximately 22.4% of the underinvesting
firms exhibit foresight (2,877 firm-year observations out of 12,820) and 25.0% of overinvesting
firms exhibit foresight (3,491 out of 13,960). We categorize about 3.8% of firms as
underinvesting with foresight and 4.6% of firms as overinvesting with foresight; approximately
8.4% of all firms are considered to be investing with managerial foresight, i.e., they are deviating
from market expectations and experiencing above-normal future returns.

4.2 Investment Deviation & Performance
Prior literature typically concludes that underinvestment or overinvestment relative to some
benchmark is not value-enhancing. However, if some managers are deviating from expected
levels of investment based on proprietary information (i.e., they are investing with foresight), we
might expect these deviations to yield above-normal returns. One way to examine the
effectiveness of the investment decision is to evaluate the change in ROA after the decision has
been made.
Figure 3 depicts the median firm-level ROA at years t and t+3 for each of the groups for
underinvesting, benchmark, and overinvesting. The figure suggests that median ROA is lowest
for the underinvesting group and highest for the overinvesting group, consistent with
expectations. Firms with higher ROA are more likely to generate excess cash flow, which they
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may then reinvest into the firm.67 It is also interesting that the median ROA in t+3 is lower than
that for the benchmark and overinvesting firms, while it is slightly higher for underinvesting.
These results may suggest a type of reversion to the mean in firm-level performance.
--------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 About Here
--------------------------------------Figure 4 provides a similar analysis for median ROA when we further separate the groups
based on foresight. By construction, the median ROA in time t+3 is the highest for the two
groups that are underinvesting with foresight (Under/Yes) and overinvesting with foresight
(Over/Yes). What is interesting is that the underinvesting firms with foresight (Under/Yes)
exhibit a significantly higher median ROA in time t than the underinvesting firms with no
foresight (Under/No), suggesting that the firms with foresight have already attained defensible
competitive advantages in some form. The same, however, is not true for the overinvesting firms.
Overinvesting firms with foresight (Over/Yes) have approximately the same median ROA in
time t than overinvesting firms with no foresight. This result suggests that the characteristics of
overinvesting firms may play a pivotal role in whether they invest with foresight.
--------------------------------------Insert Figure 4 About Here
--------------------------------------Table 4 provides some preliminary evidence that the relationship between deviations
from investment level and firm performance may be more nuanced than prior literature assumes.
The table depicts a one-way analysis of variance test for the mean change in industry-adjusted
ROA between year t and t+3. The mean change is simply the industry-adjusted ROA in year t+3
67

We will explore the idea of a cash flow effect more fully in the next two subsections.
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less that from t, such that positive (negative) numbers indicate improvement (decline) in ROA.
The results suggest that overinvesting firms, on average, actually have a significantly higher
change in mean ROA than that of the benchmark category. Underinvesting firms, on the other
hand, do not demonstrate any significant difference in their mean change in ROA relative to
either overinvesting firms or the benchmark group.
--------------------------------------Insert Table 4 About Here
---------------------------------------

4.3 Managerial & Firm-level Characteristics
We next employ tests of sample means to explore the characteristics of managers and firms that
exhibit foresight. These tests compare the sample means across groups when there are more than
two groups, and they provide univariate indications of what characteristics may influence firms
to either underinvest or overinvest. The characteristics included in this preliminary analysis are:
age of the CEO; current tenure of the CEO; whether the CEO is optimistic/overconfident; the
percentage of independent directors on the corporate board; whether the firm contains multiple
business units; and the amount of the firm’s cash flow. When we require each observation to
have all managerial and firm-level characteristics, the sample size is reduced to 5,125 firm-year
observations.

4.3.1 Characteristics of Investment Deviation
Panel A of Table 5 provides the split for the deviation from expected levels of investment within
the characteristics sample of 5,125 firm-year observations. Recall that we split the full data
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sample into quartiles, where the bottom (top) quartile is classified as underinvesting
(overinvesting). Within the smaller sample here, only 16.1% of firms are classified as
underinvesting, providing further evidence that these firms tend to exit the sample sooner due to
lower performance. Overinvesting firms, on the other hand, still constitute 25.1% of the sample.
--------------------------------------Insert Table 5 About Here
--------------------------------------Panel B of Table 5 summarizes the sample means and standard deviations for all of the
characteristics variables. Sample means highlighted in bold are statistically different than the
sample mean of the benchmark group. Appendix B provides the detail statistics for the one-way
analysis of variance for each variable.
An interesting conclusion from the analysis of variance statistics is the tendency for the
sample mean of the characteristics variables in the overinvesting group to be significantly
different than the sample mean of the benchmark. For example, the CEO tenure of overinvesting
firms is significantly longer than benchmark firms (p=0.004). Likewise, overinvesting firms,
relative to the benchmark group, have more optimistic CEOs (p=0.000) and have a smaller
percentage of independent directors (p=0.002). In other words, optimistic CEOs are more likely
to overinvest, and the smaller percentage of independent directors suggests a reduced level of
corporate control may play in role in enabling that overinvestment.
An interesting difference between underinvesting firms and overinvesting firms is the
corporate structure, where underinvesting firms are significantly more likely to have multiple
business units. The binary variable for the multisegment characteristic is set equal to 1 if the firm
contains multiple business units. The sample mean for underinvesting firms is 0.34, which is
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significantly larger than the overinvesting group (mean=0.27; p=0.001). The sample mean of
overinvesting firms is also significantly smaller than the benchmark (p=0.005).
Consistent with prior literature, we also find strong evidence for a cash flow effect on
investment. The sample mean of cash flow for overinvesting firms is significantly larger than
that of underinvesting firms (p=0.000) and of the benchmark group (p=0.000). Likewise, the
sample mean of underinvesting firms is significantly smaller that that of the benchmark
(p=0.000). Firms with more cash flow tend to overinvest relative to a market-model benchmark,
while firms with less cash underinvest.

4.3.2 Characteristics of Managerial Foresight
Panel A of Table 6 details the further breakdown of the smaller sample with managerial and
firm-level characteristics (5,125 firm-year observations). Similar to Section 4.1 above, the
underinvesting and overinvesting firms are further categorized as having foresight if they exhibit
both positive and improving industry-adjusted ROA in t+3. Panel B of Table 6 is also analogous
to Panel B of Table 5, where we provide sample means and standard deviations of the
characteristics variables, which are split across groups based on investment deviation and
industry-adjusted ROA performance. Appendix C provides details of the one-way analysis of
variance statistics for the sample mean differences across the groups.
--------------------------------------Insert Table 6 About Here
--------------------------------------Characteristics variables where the sample mean for the underinvesting group with
declining ROA and the overinvesting group with declining ROA are both significantly different
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from the benchmark group include CEO tenure, CEO optimism, the percentage of independent
directors, and cash flow. Firms tend not to exhibit foresight when they have CEOs with longer
tenures, CEOs who are more optimistic, where boards have fewer independent directors, and
firms have more cash flow; these firms deviate from the benchmark investment levels and
decrease their returns on investment by doing so. While the sample mean of CEO age is not
significantly different for underinvesting or overinvesting firms, we do find that the sample mean
of CEO age for overinvesting firms with increasing ROA is significantly higher than the
benchmark group.
Our previous results show that optimistic CEOs tend to overinvest; in Panel B of Table 6
we see that this result holds for firms that experience both decreasing and increasing ROA in t+3.
However, the difference between the sample means of the decreasing and increasing groups is
not significant. For overinvesting firms that experience declining ROA, the sample mean of CEO
optimism is also significantly larger than both sub-groups of underinvesting firms.
In the broader sample from section 4.3.1, we find that underinvesting firms are
significantly more likely to have multiple business units. In Panel B of Table 6, we see that the
underinvesting firms with declining ROA have the largest sample mean, and this difference is
significant larger than both sub-groups of overinvesting firms. The sample mean of
underinvesting firms with increasing ROA is also significantly larger than that of overinvesting
firms with decreasing ROA.
We also find further evidence for a cash flow effect on investing in these results.
Overinvesting firms that experience decreasing ROA have a significantly larger sample mean of
cash flow than both underinvesting sub-groups and the benchmark group. More important, the
sample mean of cash flow for overinvesting firms that experience declining ROA is significantly
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larger than the sample mean of overinvesting firms that experience increasing ROA. Not only
does more cash flow lead to overinvesting, it tends to lead to overinvesting and
underperformance.

5. Multinomial Logit Results
The summary statistics in Section 4 provide an interesting background on the nature of firms that
underinvest and overinvest relative to a market-model benchmark. In this section, we extend the
analysis to examine the likelihood of managerial foresight using a set of multinomial logit
models. Essentially, the multinomial logit model estimates separate binary logit models for each
pair of outcome categories separately. We use multinomial logit models because the outcomes
are assumed to be nominal, i.e., unordered.
In the first test (see Table 7), we examine the likelihood that firms will either underinvest
or overinvest, relative to the benchmark group. Similarly, the second test (see Table 8) examines
the likelihood that firms will either underinvest or overinvest, while also examining the subgroups based on ROA performance in t+3.
--------------------------------------Insert Table 7 & Table 8 About Here
--------------------------------------We will confine our discussion of the results to two of the control variables, CEO
Optimism and Cash Flow, because they provide the clearest indication of results that are
consistent with expectations from prior literature. We find that optimistic CEOs are significantly
more likely to overinvest and that the overinvesting will lead to declining ROA in the future.
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Similarly, we find that firms with more cash flow are significantly more likely to overinvest;
these firms are also significantly more likely to overinvest and experience declining ROA.

6. Robustness Checks
As I discuss in the next section under limitations, one of the important factors in our empirical
analysis of foresight in this paper is the performance window. The main results examine the
difference in performance between times t and t+3, because foresight will typically precede rent
generation (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee 2005). While three years may be appropriate for some types of
capital investments, different performance horizons may impact our analysis of managerial
foresight. This section provides a robustness check by presenting results from a two-year
horizon, i.e., where above-normal returns are measured in t+2 after the investment decision.
--------------------------------------Insert Table 9 About Here
--------------------------------------Table 9 presents the results analogous to Panel B and Panel C of Table 2. Here, the
sample size for data in t+2 if 59,980 firm-year observations, meaning that we increase the sample
size by 5,407 observations by decreasing the performance window. Panel A of Table 9 shows
that 23.7% of firms are underinvesting, 50.8% of firms invest at the benchmark, and 25.5% of
firms are overinvesting. These results for the t+2 sample are nearly identical to those from the
t+3 sample. Panel B of Table 9 also shows that the t+2 sample is very similar to that from t+3.
The main difference, as expected because we are working with a shorter performance horizon, is
that the t+2 sample contains fewer firms that exit. These similar results suggest that modifying
the performance horizon by a single year should not significantly alter the managerial and firm-
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level characteristics that are associated with foresight. In untabulated results, we further show
that the tenor of the relationship between underinvesting and overinvesting and the
characteristics variables also remains the same within the t+2 sample.

7. Conclusion
The main objectives of this paper are to define a theory of managerial foresight and to introduce
a new measure that captures foresight. We also highlight the characteristics of managers and
firms that appear to exhibit foresight.
We say that managers exhibit foresight when they make unique investment decisions
today that deliver above-normal returns in the future. The context of our analysis is the level of
firm investment, where unique investments deviate from the expected investment level of the
external capital market. We define underinvestment as investing less than an expected level,
while overinvestment is investing more, and we estimate these expected levels using a marketmodel. By utilizing their proprietary information within imperfect strategic factor markets, some
managers will deliver above-normal returns, either by underinvesting or overinvesting.
Within our full sample, we find that approximately 22.4% of underinvesting firms exhibit
foresight and 25.0% of overinvesting firms exhibit foresight. Overall, about 8.4% of firms are
considered to be investing with foresight: about 3.8% of firms underinvest with foresight and
4.6% of firms overinvest with foresight. We also use one-way analysis of variance tests to
examine the managerial and firm-level characteristics of investment deviation (i.e.,
underinvestment and overinvestment) and managerial foresight. We present evidence that the
performance of overinvesting firms may actually be higher, on average, than that of a benchmark
category, and that the performance of underinvesting firms is not significantly worse. We also
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show that overinvesting firms tend to have more optimistic CEOs, who appear to face weaker
governance controls on their board of directors. Further, both overinvesting in general and
overinvesting with no foresight are strongly associated with cash flow.

7.1 Limitations
While the preliminary results in this paper suggest one potential theory and empirical
examination of managerial foresight, several limitations of the analysis are important to
recognize.
As mentioned in the discussion of this paper’s setting, luck almost certainly plays some
role in the ability of firms to exhibit above-normal returns. This paper makes no attempt to
distinguish between luck and foresight, although we recognize that it is an important limitation to
drawing conclusions about managerial foresight.
Even absent luck, the measurement of managerial foresight must confront several
limitations related to measurement concerns. By estimating an investment expectation model
using residual analysis, we are essentially assuming that the average deviation from expected
investment across industry-years is equal to zero. In this case, the definition of industry
classifications, a problem faced in many research settings, is a particularly important aspect of
the expectations model. Further, the explanatory variable in our market-based model of
expectations is the firm’s market-to-book ratio, which is also subject to mismeasurement. The
MTB ratio is a measurement, at best, of the firm’s average set of investment opportunities. For
our purposes, though, the ratio delivers something of an advantage, in that it is the precisely
market’s expectations of growth that we want to measure.
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An important aspect of the empirical approach in this paper is the use of industryadjusted ROA as the measure for above-normal returns. Recall that firms must exhibit positive
and increasing ROA to be classified as having foresight. An alternative measure of performance
might be the firm’s cumulative abnormal returns based on stock price. Assuming a semi-strong
efficiency of the stock market implies that these returns should reflect all publicly available
information about the performance prospects of the firm. One aspect of this information is of
course the firm’s level of investment, as well as its deviation from market expectations. We opt
for ROA in our preliminary analysis because it most closely captures the effectiveness of the
investment decision alone. While ROA can be subject to earnings and asset management
practices, these types of manipulations would also likely impact market value. Further, if
managers use foresight to appropriate rents for themselves, as they appear to do in Ahuja et al.
(2005), the stock price of the firm may actually be depressed as a consequence of greater
managerial foresight (Castanias and Helfat 1992; Coff 1999).
Determining the window to evaluate above-normal returns (whether using industryadjusted ROA or cumulative abnormal stock returns) is also a complicating factor of the analysis
in this paper. We opt for measuring the change in industry-adjusted ROA from year t to t+3,
because it likely takes at least a few years for rents to accrue from the capital expenditures
studied in this analysis. In a robustness check detailed in the previous section, we demonstrate
that shortening the performance window by one year does not appear to affect the empirical
conclusions in this paper.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for various samples in this paper. The Full Sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2006 that are used to
compute the first-stage regression estimates of industry-year levels of investment. The t+3 Sample consists of firms for which we have
ROA information in t+3; some firms “exit” the sample because they are no longer listed in Compustat, either for positive or negative
reasons. Sample summary statistics are also provided for individual years (1996 and 2006) and for the retail industry (Fama-French
industry 42) in those years.

Observations
Mean
Std Dev
Percentiles
1%
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
99%

Full Sample
75163
0.000
0.666

t +3 Sample
54573
-0.001
0.667

t = 1996
6758
0.000
0.231

t = 2006
6769
0.000
0.247

Retail (1996)
355
0.000
0.292

Retail (2006)
271
0.000
0.049

-0.315
-0.078
-0.040
-0.017
0.012
0.075
0.548

-0.317
-0.075
-0.038
-0.015
0.017
0.089
0.617

-0.280
-0.110
-0.053
-0.022
0.016
0.077
0.700

-0.374
-0.074
-0.035
-0.011
0.008
0.064
0.541

-0.280
-0.083
-0.041
-0.018
0.022
0.074
0.208

-0.091
-0.049
-0.035
-0.006
0.022
0.061
0.153
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Table 2: Basic descriptive statistics
Panel A: Full data sample used to calculate investment deviation levels based on industry-year
regressions of firm-level investment on the firm’s market-to-book ratio. Firms in the bottom
(top) quartile are classified as underinvesting (overinvesting). Firms in the middle two quartiles
are the benchmark, considered to be investing according to market expectations.
Underinvesting
Benchmark
Overinvesting

Obs
18798
37581
18784

%
25.0
50.0
25.0

Total

75163

100.0

Panel B: Data sample for firms that contain ROA data in t+3 in order to calculate whether firmlevel industry-adjusted ROA increases or decreases
Underinvesting
Benchmark
Overinvesting

Obs
12820
27793
13960

%
23.5
50.9
25.6

Total

54573

100.0

Panel C: Data sample breakdown based on underinvesting/overinvesting and whether the firm
exhibits foresight from time t to t+3
Obs

%

Underinvesting
No Foresight
Foresight
Exit

9943
2877
5978

13.2
3.8
8.0

Benchmark
Exit

27793
9788

37.0
13.0

Overinvesting
No Foresight
Foresight
Exit

10469
3491
4824

13.9
4.6
6.4

Total

75163

100.0
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Table 3: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test. Compares the sample means of the residual
across the three main categories of underinvesting, benchmark, and overinvesting. Significantly different sample means are
highlighted in bold.

Deviation from Expected Investment (Residual)
Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Benchmark

0.76

Underinvesting
x
x

Underinvesting

18798

-0.13

Benchmark

37581

-0.02

0.02

0.112
0.000

x
x

Overinvesting

18784

0.16

1.08

0.292
0.000

0.180
0.000

Total

75163

0.00

0.67
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Overinvesting

x
x

Table 4: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for mean
ROA change between year t and t+3 across the underinvesting, benchmark, and overinvesting
groups. Significant differences in sample means are highlighted in bold.
Panel A: Full sample of 54,573 firm-year observations
Change in industry-adjusted ROA between t and t +3
Underinvesting
x
x

Benchmark

Benchmark

-0.023
1.000

x
x

Overinvesting

0.314
0.129

0.338
0.031

Underinvesting
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Overinvesting

x
x

Table 5: Summary statistics for investment deviation from benchmark within the smaller characteristics sample
Panel A: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in each group
Obs
827
3012
1286
5125

Underinvesting
Benchmark
Overinvesting
Total

%
16.1
58.8
25.1
100.0

Panel B: Mean and standard deviations for characteristics of each group

Underinvesting
Benchmark
Overinvesting

CEO Age
Mean
SD
55.54
7.82
55.21
7.52
55.42
7.66

CEO Tenure
Mean
SD
8.34
7.75
7.92
7.79
8.31
8.78

Total

55.31

8.20

7.61

7.92

CEO Optimism
Mean
SD
0.41
0.49
0.38
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.42
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0.49

% Indep. Dirs.
Mean
SD
0.66
0.17
0.67
0.17
0.18
0.65

Multi. Firm
Mean
SD
0.41
0.49
0.34
0.47
0.43
0.25

Cash Flow
Mean
SD
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.15

0.66

0.33

0.11

0.17

0.47

0.11

Table 6: Summary statistics for investment foresight within the smaller characteristics sample
Panel A: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in each group
Obs

%

Underinvesting
No Foresight
Foresight

548
279

10.7
5.4

Benchmark

3012

58.8

Overinvesting
No Foresight
Foresight

884
402

17.2
7.8

Total

5125

100.0

Panel B: Mean and standard deviations for characteristics of each group

Underinvesting
with Declining ROA
Underinvesting
with Increasing ROA
Benchmark
Overinvesting
with Declining ROA
Overinvesting
with Increasing ROA
Total

CEO Age
Mean
SD
55.42
7.57

CEO Tenure
Mean
SD
8.31
10.01

CEO Optimism
Mean
SD
0.37
0.48

% Indep. Dirs.
Mean
SD
0.17
0.60

Multi. Firm
Mean
SD
0.43
0.50

55.30

7.18

7.88

5.73

0.39

0.49

0.64

0.17

0.39

0.49

55.48
55.51

7.40
7.84

8.13
9.34

7.71
8.48

0.37
0.57

0.48
0.50

0.68
0.63

0.17
0.18

0.34
0.24

0.47
0.42

54.12

7.40

8.30

7.21

0.47

0.50

0.61

0.18

0.28

0.45

55.39

7.45

8.33

7.73

0.40

0.49

0.66

0.17

0.33

0.47
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Cash Flow
Mean
SD
0.13

0.11

0.09

0.10

0.10

0.10

0.17

0.14

0.11

0.11

0.11

0.11

Table 7: Multinomial logit model of underinvesting and overinvesting

Benchmark Group:

Baseline Investment
Underinvesting Overinvesting

CEO Optimism
Cash Flow
CEO is not Chair (0,1)
Independent Directors (%)
CEO Tenure (log)
CEO Long-term Incentives (%)
Guidance (0,1)
No. Segments
Total Assets (log)
Constant

[1]

[2]

0.091
(0.188)
-0.218
(0.886)
-0.761***
(0.210)
-1.940***
(0.439)
0.056
(0.087)
0.053
(0.318)
-0.543***
(0.153)
0.021
(0.057)
0.125*
(0.072)
-2.015**
(0.944)

0.348***
(0.132)
4.008***
(0.923)
-0.140
(0.144)
-1.519***
(0.384)
0.013
(0.067)
0.165
(0.226)
0.023
(0.121)
-0.098*
(0.056)
-0.007
(0.051)
-1.191*
(0.703)

Observations
3,765
3,765
Pseudo R-squared
0.0482
0.0482
Log likelihood
-2531
-2531
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Multinomial logit model of underinvesting and overinvesting with sub-groups for ROA performance in t+3

Benchmark Group:

CEO Optimism
Cash Flow
CEO is not Chair (0,1)
Independent Directors (%)
CEO Tenure (log)
CEO Long-term Incentives (%)
Guidance (0,1)
No. Segments
Total Assets (log)
Constant

Baseline Investment
Underinvesting Underinvesting Overinvesting Overinvesting
ROA Declines ROA Increases ROA Declines ROA Increases
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
-0.151
(0.229)
2.852*
(1.483)
-0.673**
(0.269)
-2.449***
(0.510)
0.125
(0.113)
0.126
(0.410)
-0.246
(0.207)
0.059
(0.065)
0.032
(0.084)
-2.727**
(1.222)

0.286
(0.228)
-2.052***
(0.722)
-0.834***
(0.287)
-1.324**
(0.554)
-0.008
(0.111)
-0.018
(0.378)
-0.826***
(0.201)
-0.016
(0.081)
0.219**
(0.092)
-2.974**
(1.233)

Observations
3,765
3,765
Pseudo R-squared
0.0524
0.0524
Log likelihood
-3098
-3098
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.385***
(0.148)
6.055***
(1.095)
-0.291*
(0.174)
-1.187***
(0.426)
0.029
(0.079)
0.100
(0.254)
0.124
(0.136)
-0.080
(0.064)
-0.009
(0.056)
-2.329***
(0.840)

0.268
(0.195)
0.751
(0.979)
0.082
(0.189)
-2.022***
(0.549)
-0.002
(0.092)
0.219
(0.346)
-0.122
(0.180)
-0.119
(0.080)
0.010
(0.070)
-1.394
(0.908)

3,765
0.0524
-3098

3,765
0.0524
-3098

Table 9: Basic descriptive statistics for performance window t+2

Panel A: Data sample for firms that contain ROA data in t+2 in order to calculate whether firmlevel industry-adjusted ROA increases or decreases
Underinvesting
Benchmark
Overinvesting

Obs
14209
30473
15298

%
23.7
50.8
25.5

Total

59980

100.0

Panel C: Data sample breakdown based on underinvesting/overinvesting and whether the firm
exhibits foresight from time t to t+2
Obs

%

Underinvesting
No Foresight
Foresight
Exit

11171
3038
4589

14.9
4.0
6.1

Benchmark
Exit

30473
7108

40.5
9.5

Overinvesting
No Foresight
Foresight
Exit

11426
3872
3486

15.2
5.2
4.6

Total

75163

100.0
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Figure 1: Histograms of residuals for various samples.
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Figure 2: Median firm-level ROA for firms in categories based on whether they underinvest and
overinvest relative to a benchmark, and whether the firm survives to period t+3 in the analysis or
exits the sample.
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Figure 3: Median ROA at times t and t+3, for the groups underinvesting, benchmark, and
overinvesting.
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Figure 4: Median ROA at times t and t+3, for the groups underinvesting, benchmark, and
overinvesting, also split out based on foresight: Under/No=Underinvesting with no foresight;
Under/Yes=Underinvesting with foresight; Benchmark=Investing according to market
expectations; Over/No=Overinvesting with no foresight; Over/Yes=Overinvesting with
foresight.
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Appendix A: A Short Analysis of the Retail Industry in 1996
In order to provide some context to the measure of foresight developed in this paper, we explore
some of the firms from in sample from the retail industry (Fama-French industry 42) starting in
1996. Note that this analysis is preliminary and is only meant at this stage to suggest the type of
investigation that can be carried out using our approach to managerial foresight. Summary
statistics for the retail industry in 1996 are presented in Table 1, and a histogram of the residuals
for this industry-year is depicted in Figure 1.
One example of a firm that overinvested with foresight in 1996 was Costco Wholesale.
Following on the heels of its unsuccessful merger with PriceClub, Costco began a rapid period of
expansion through the U.S. and the world. At the close of 2005 (the beginning period of the
analysis in this paper), Costco traded for $15.25 per share. According to our analysis, Costco
overinvested with foresight during both 2006 and 2007, when its capital expenditures were $507
million and $553 million. By the end of period t+3 in 1998, the stock price had climbed to
$72.19. It was $91.25 at the end of 1999.
Our analysis next suggests that Costco continued to overinvest but with no foresight
during the four years from 1999 to 2002. By the end of 2002, three years after the first year of
overinvesting with no foresight, the stock price had fallen to $56.12 (note that price is adjusted
for a 2:1 split in January 2000). From there, the stock did begin to climb again, reaching $74.36
by 2003, $96.82 by 2004, and $98.94 by 2005, but it was only just returning to the highs
originally reached at the end of 1999.
Rite-Aid represents a firm in our sample that overinvested with no foresight in 1996. Its
stock price closed 1995 at $31.56 and hit $97.14 (adjusted for 2:1 split in February 1998) by the
end of 1998. These gains were illusory, though. By 2002, the Chairman/CEO and other senior
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executives were indicted (and later found guilty) of fraud.68 The overinvestment in expansion
carried out by Rite-Aid required accounting fraud to prop up the firm. It was forced to restate its
earnings over this period by $1.6 billion, the most-ever for a public company at that time. Its
stock plunged in March 1999 and has never fully recovered.69
Some of the retail firms that made corporate investments in line with market expectations
during this period include Albertson’s, Safeway, Wal-Mart, Walgreen, Dollar General Corp, and
Family Dollar Stores.
Intimate Brands, spun off from The Limited, Inc., in 1995, underinvested with foresight
in 1996. The company consisted primarily of the Victoria’s Secret catalog and stores and Bath &
Body Works stores. By the end of 1999 (t+3 following the underinvestment with foresight), the
stock price had climbed from $14.75 (prior to the underinvestment) to $30.38. Intimate Brands
was re-integrated into The Limited as Limited Brands in 2002.70

68

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-06-22/business/0206220004_1_rite-aid-grass-aid-corp
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-03-19/business/9903190179_1_rite-aid-aid-corp-ziegler
70
http://www.limitedbrands.com/our_company/about_us/timeline.aspx
69
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Appendix B: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups
CEO Age

CEO Tenure
Underinvesting
x
x

Benchmark

Benchmark

-0.337
0.779

x
x

Overinvesting

-0.118
1.000

0.219
1.000

x
x

Underinvesting
x
x

Benchmark

Overinvesting

Benchmark

-0.029
0.450

x
x

Overinvesting

0.102
0.000

0.131
0.000

x
x

Benchmark

Overinvesting

Underinvesting

Overinvesting

CEO Optimism
Underinvesting

Multisegment Firm
Underinvesting
Underinvesting
x
x

Underinvesting
x
x

Benchmark

Benchmark

-0.420
0.529

x
x

Overinvesting

0.436
0.650

0.856
0.004

x
x

Benchmark

Overinvesting

Underinvesting

% Independent Directors
Underinvesting
Underinvesting
x
x

Overinvesting

Benchmark

0.012
0.237

x
x

Overinvesting

-0.008
0.972

-0.020
0.002

x
x

Underinvesting
x
x

Benchmark

Overinvesting

Benchmark

-0.024
0.000

x
x

Overinvesting

0.032
0.000

0.055
0.000

Cash Flow
Underinvesting

Benchmark

-0.029
0.336

x
x

Overinvesting

-0.078
0.001

-0.049
0.005

x
x
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x
x

Appendix C: One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups
CEO Age
Underinvesting
ROA Increases

Underinvesting
ROA Declines

Underinvesting
ROA Declines
x
x

Benchmark

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

-0.115
1.000

x
x

Benchmark

0.065
1.000

0.180
1.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

0.094
1.000

0.209
1.000

0.029
1.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

-1.296
1.000

-1.180
1.000

-1.360
0.087

-1.390
0.272

x
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

Benchmark

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

Underinvesting
ROA Declines

Underinvesting
ROA Declines
x
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

-2.135
0.171

x
x

Benchmark

-1.880
0.040

0.255
1.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

-0.673
1.000

1.462
0.485

1.207
0.039

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

-1.715
0.361

0.420
1.000

0.165
1.000

-1.042
1.000

CEO Tenure
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x
x

Appendix C (cont’d): One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups
CEO Optimism
Underinvesting
ROA Increases

Underinvesting
ROA Declines

Underinvesting
ROA Declines
x
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

0.023
1.000

x
x

Benchmark

0.005
1.000

-0.019
1.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

0.199
0.000

0.175
0.002

0.194
0.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

0.102
0.484

0.078
1.000

0.097
0.039

-0.097
0.173

x
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

Benchmark

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

% Independent Directors
Underinvesting
ROA Declines
Underinvesting
x
ROA Declines
x

Benchmark

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

0.044
0.274

x
x

Benchmark

0.079
0.000

0.036
0.129

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

0.037
0.254

-0.007
1.000

-0.042
0.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

0.012
1.000

-0.032
0.751

-0.068
0.000

-0.025
0.768
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Overinvesting
ROA Increases

x
x

Appendix C (cont’d): One-way analysis of variance using the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test for sample means across groups
Multisegment Firm
Underinvesting
ROA Declines
Underinvesting
x
ROA Declines
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

Benchmark

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

-0.038
1.000

x
x

Benchmark

-0.087
0.280

-0.049
1.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

-0.193
0.000

-0.156
0.006

-0.106
0.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

-0.150
0.026

-0.112
0.233

-0.063
0.540

0.044
1.000

x
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

Benchmark
Benchmark

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

Underinvesting
ROA Declines

Underinvesting
ROA Declines
x
x

Underinvesting
ROA Increases

-0.041
0.008

x
x

Benchmark

-0.025
0.057

0.016
0.628

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Declines

0.041
0.000

0.082
0.000

0.066
0.000

x
x

Overinvesting
ROA Increases

-0.015
1.000

0.026
0.203

0.009
1.000

-0.057
0.000

Cash Flow
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x
x

